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The Regional Economic Effects of Immigration 
 
Abstract: 
The effects of immigration on the host country are pervasive and long-term.  It is not 
surprising that they have been extensively analysed, not least the economic effects which 
have been the subject of both theoretical and empirical research.  While some of the 
empirical research has had a regional dimension, this has often been incidental to the 
analysis of the labour market – the effects of immigration on wages and employment 
prospects of the native-born depend on the regional migration response.  In contrast, there 
has been little analysis of the general effects of immigration on regional economies per 
se.  This paper contributes to the filling of this gap by constructing a small two-region 
computable general-equilibrium (CGE) model which is used to analyse the effects of 
various immigration shocks on regional variables such as output, employment, the labour 
force, unemployment, wages and welfare.  We simulate the effects of different types of 
immigration shocks and distinguish between short-run and long-run effects.  We also 
consider the effectiveness of government intervention designed to alleviate the adverse 
regional  effects  of  immigration  including  the  possibility  that  regional  governments 
behave in a welfare-maximising way. 
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1. Introduction 
"New World" countries such as Australia, the USA, Canada and New Zealand 
have  thrived  on,  and  for  all  practical  purposes  built  on  waves  of  immigration  from 
countries such as England, Scotland, Ireland, Italy and Holland. 
  In  more  recent  times  the  New-World  countries  have  been  hit  by  a  wave  of 
immigration from a different direction. Immigration from the Old World has continued.  
On top of this, however, there has been substantial immigration from Asian and African 
countries   In the last century Australia, for example, has been hit by immigration from 
countries like China, India, Malaysia, Vietnam, Sri Lanka, Sudan and Ethiopia. 
  Not surprisingly this rapid expansion of immigration has been accompanied, in 
recent times, by a similarly rapid expansion of studies aimed at uncovering the economic 
effects of immigration. Such studies operated both theoretically and empirically. 
  Existing theoretical studies focus primarily on the effect of immigration on the 
labour-market of the host country (see Borjas, 1999, 2006, and Borjas et al., 1997, for 
examples of such studies) although they also include some which aim at assessing the 
overall economic benefit to the host country of immigration - the so-called "immigration 
surplus" introduced by Borjas (1995).   This concept has been analysed more recently by 
Borjas (2003) and extended by Felbermayr and Kohler (2007) to include international 
trade. 
  A further extension of the theoretical approach has been to introduce economic 
growth and so to permit an investigation of the long-term effects of immigration on the 
host country.  An early contribution of this type was by Chiswick et al. (1992) who 
analysed the macro-economic effects of immigration in a four-factor growth model. A 
more  recent  study  by  Drinkwater  et  al.  (2007)  extends  the  work  to  encompass 
endogenous growth.   
Hirschman  (2005),  in  an  interesting  and  wide-ranging  paper  discussing  US 
immigration,  pleads  for  a  much  longer-term  perspective,  arguing  that  the  effects  of 
immigration on the host country (the US in this case) should be analysed over centuries, 
not months or years. 
  On the empirical front, early work (see a review of this by Friedberg and Hunt, 
1995)  also  focussed  on  the  effects  of  immigration  on  the  labour-market  of  the  host  
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country and this has continued to be the main focus of empirical work, with econometric 
development  aimed  at  disentangling  wage-effects  from  confounding  effects  and  in 
extending the analysis from the initial effect on the US (see Borjas, 2006, for example) to 
other countries including Canada (see Hou and Bourne, 2006, and Ley, 2007), Australia 
(see Islam, 2007, Ley, 2007), the United Kingdom (see Hatton and Tani, 2005) and Italy 
(see Venturini and Villosio, 2006), to mention a few. 
  Thus  the  work  done  so  far  on  the  economic  effects  on  the  host  country  of 
immigration from the rest of the world is clearly extensive.  There are still, however, 
questions of an interesting and important type which remain unanswered.  The aim of the 
present paper is to help fill this gap by focussing on the regional effects per se of an 
immigration shock.  We pursue this aim by posing five questions relating to the regions 
of a country: 
•  Suppose there is an increase in immigration which is evenly spread across the 
regions of a country.  What will be the effects on the regional economies (output, 
employment, welfare, wages and so on) in the short run and in the long run? 
•  Suppose that the immigration increase is concentrated in one region.  What will 
be the effects on the regional economies in the short run and in the long run? 
•  Suppose that regional governments attempt to use expenditure and taxation policy 
to alleviate the adverse consequences of immigration on the region’s economy.  
Will this be effective? 
•  Suppose the central government acts to offset the undesirable regional effects of 
immigration  by  a  regionally-differentiated  expenditure  policy.    Will  it  be 
successful? 
•  Suppose that regional governments act strategically in the face of immigration 
increases.  Will this mitigate the effects of immigration on the region’s economy? 
 
  The approach used  to address these questions is based on a theoretical model 
which we solve numerically in the manner adopted by computable-general-equilibrium 
(CGE) researchers.  We construct a small two-region general-equilibrium model which 
we linearise and calibrate and then use to simulate the regional effect on a range of 
important variables such as output, wages, employment, labour-force, unemployment and  
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welfare of a variety of immigration shocks.  A distinction is made between short-run and 
long-run effects, a distinction which is based on whether inter-regional migration takes 
place or not.  The shocks imposed on the model are chosen to enable us to address the 
questions posed above and an extensive sensitivity analysis is undertaken to assess the 
dependence of our results on the closure assumptions and the particular parameterisation 
assumed for the main simulations. 
  The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows.  In the next section we set out 
the model.  In section three we carry out the linearisation and calibration of the model 
and in section four present the results of the simulations designed to address our five 
questions as well as briefly discuss the results of the sensitivity analysis.  In section five 
we  summarise  our  results  and  draw  conclusions  about  the  regional  effects  of 
immigration.   
 
2. The model 
We use as our framework a two-region general equilibrium model taken from a 
class which has played an important part in the fiscal-nationalism literature, viz., models 
of multi-regional federations with a given freely-mobile supply of labour. A model of this 
class has been used in, e.g.,  Boadway and Flatters (1982), Myers (1990), Petchey (1993, 
1995), Petchey and Shapiro (2000), Groenewold et al. (2000, 2003) and Groenewold and 
Hagger (2005, 2007) .  In these models labour is allowed to migrate costlessly between 
regions in search of maximum welfare and they typically impose, as an equilibrium 
condition, that the utility of the representative household be the same in all regions.   
The model which we build has two regions, each with households, firms and a 
regional government.  In addition to regional governments, there is also a national  
government.  The households and firms are optimisers, for all but the last simulation the 
regional government is not a maximiser and the national government’s behaviour is 
treated as exogenous.
1   
                                                 
1 The regional governments are assumed to be exogenous for all but one of the simulations since we are 
interested in the effects of regional governments’ policy actions which requires exogenous policy variables. 
It would be possible to assume that the national government also maximises an objective function but since 
we  are  interested  in  the  regional  effects  of  exogenous  national  government  immigration  decisions,  an 
exogenous national government is required.  See Roemer (2006) for an interesting recent model of a two- 
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The firms in a region produce a single good which we assume to be different to 
that produced in the other region.  It is supplied, in the region in which it is produced, to 
households and to the regional government as tax revenue.  Households consume some, 
trade some with households in the other region and give some up to the national 
government as income tax.  Governments costlessly transform the good they receive as 
tax revenue into a government good.  The regional government supplies the transformed 
good in equal amounts to households in its region free of charge and finances the 
purchase of the good by a payroll tax levied on firms located in its region.  The national 
government provides output to households in both regions (possibly different amounts 
per capita) and finances this by a tax levied at a uniform rate on household incomes in 
both regions. 
Output is produced using a single (variable) factor, labour, which is supplied by 
households.
2  We assume that households supply labour only to firms in the region in 
which they live, thus excluding the possibility that they live in one region and commute 
to work in the other.  Regional population and labour force are therefore effectively the 
same. We do allow inter-regional migration, however, and this is one of three sources of 
inter-connectedness between the two regions.  We follow the literature cited above and 
assume migration to be costless and to occur in response to inter-regional utility 
differentials.  Alternatives would be to allow internal migration to equalise wages, 
consumption or unemployment rates across regions but given that households are 
assumed to choose consumption to maximise utility it is natural to assume a similar 
motivation for migration decisions. 
We wish to model the labour market to allow for the possibility of unemployment 
in each region.  Since the fear that large immigrant inflows may cause unemployment is 
an important policy concern in practice, it is important to include equilibrium 
unemployment in the model.  There are many ways in which this has been achieved in 
recent regional literature: a fixed wage as in the multi-regional model of tax-competition 
by Ogawa et al. (2006) as well as in the two-region model of Fuerst and Huber (2006); an 
                                                                                                                                               
country  world  with  an  optimising  world  government  which  might  be  adapted  to  apply  to  a  national 
government in a two-region country.   
 
2 It is straightforward to assume that there is a fixed factor (such as land or capital) in each region which is 
owned by the residents of the region to whom the firms’ profits are distributed.  
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efficiency-wage model  as in Zenou (2006); job search as used by Epifani and Gancia 
(2005) in a model used to investigate spatial productivity differentials and by  Moller and 
Aldashev (2006) in their investigation of participation rates in East and West Germany; 
or a union-based model used by Roemer (2006).  We use a variant of the last; we assume 
that  in each region firms bargain with a union which represents households.  Bargaining 
is assumed to be restricted to wages and, once the wage has been agreed upon, firms 
choose employment to maximise profits.  There is no reason why employment should 
equal the labour force in equilibrium so that, as required, the model allows for 
equilibrium unemployment.   
Since migration equalises utility and not unemployment across regions, there is no 
reason why unemployment rates should be equalised by the forces of migration.  In this 
sense the model generates endogenous unemployment disparities as the outcome of any 
differences in exogenous variables and parameters across regions and the disparities can 
be thought of in terms of compensating differentials in a broad sense. 
There are therefore three sources of interconnectedness between the regions – 
inter-regional migration, inter-regional trade and the redistribution carried out by the 
national government. We abstract from other possible inter-regional connections.  So, we 
assume that each regional government supplies the government good only to households 
living in its own region, thus abstracting from inter-regional spillover effects in the 
provision of government goods. Further, we assume that each firm is owned by 
households in the region in which it is located.  Given our earlier assumption that firms 
employ labour only from households in the region, we also abstract completely from 
inter-regional factor income flows. 
Finally, immigration is modelled very simply as an increase in the exogenous 
national labour force.  Our model abstracts from skill differentials which have featured 
importantly in the literature on the economic effects of immigration so that there is only a 
single homogeneous type of labour and immigration simply augments the labour supply.  
In the short run (before inter-regional migration responds to changes in the economic 
environment) the regional distribution of the immigrants is important so that we need to 
make an assumption about this distribution.  In the long run with free inter-regional 
migration, the only direct effect of an immigration shock is on the national labour force,  
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which is then distributed via internal migration to equalise welfare across regions in our 
model. 
More formally, we set out the model as follows.
 3   
 
 
2.1  The representative household  
  The representative household of region i operates with a utility function of the 
form:   
(1) 
1i 2i i δ
i 1i 2i i V C C G i
γ γ β = ,    i = 1, 2 
where  Vi  =  utility of the representative household, region i, 
  C1i  =  real private consumption of good 1 per household, region i, 
  C2i  =  real private consumption of good 2 per household, region i, 
  Gi  =  real government-provided consumption per household, region i. 
βi , γji and δi are constants with: 
  0 i > β ,            i = 1,2 
  0 < γji < 1,           i, j = 1,2 
  0 < δi < 1          i = 1, 2 
  γ1i + γ2i + δi  = 1,        i = 1,2 
  The representative household in region i takes Gi as given and chooses Cji 
(j=1,2) so as to maximise Vi  subject to the constraint imposed by its after-tax income: 
  C11 + C21/P = (1-M)J1,        
  P.C12 + C22 = (1-M)J2,        
where   M   = rate of national government income tax, 
  P   = price of good 1 in terms of good 2, and 
  Ji   = real household income in region i. 
Note that each household’s income is expressed in terms of output of its own region.  The 
solution to the household’s problem is given by: 
(2)  Cji = (γji/(γ1i+γ2i))(1-M)Ji.P
j-i,     i, j = 1,2 
Real income per household in region i (expressed in terms of good i) is defined as: 
                                                 
3 Definitions of all variables are reproduced in Appendix 1.  
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  Ji = ΠHi + Wi* + Ui.UBi    i = 1,2  
where  ΠHi = real profit distribution per household, region i 
  Wi* = real wage income per household, region i 
  Ui   = unemployment rate, region i 
  UBi = real unemployment benefits per unemployed person, region i 
Wi*, the real wage per household, is interpreted as, Wi, the real wage per worker in 
region i  weighted by the probability of employment in region i.  Hence Wi* can be 
replaced by (Li/Ni)Wi where Wi is the real wage rate in region i, Li is employment in 
region i and Ni is the workforce (= population) in region i.  Using this, Ji can be written 
as: 
(3)  Ji = ΠHi + (Li/Ni).Wi + Ui.UBi = ΠHi + (1-Ui).Wi + Ui.UBi,   i = 1,2 
where we have used the definition of the unemployment rate: 
(4)  Ui =(Ni – Li)/Ni = 1 – Li/Ni,    i = 1,2. 
  We assume that inter-regional migration of households occurs and that it 
continues until utility per household is equalised in the two regions so that in (long-run) 
equilibrium: 
(5)   V1 = V2 
This formulation incorporates the assumption that inter-regional migration is costless.  
Clearly in practice this is not the case although it is not an uncommon formulation in the 
literature.  There are papers such as Mansoorian and Myers (1993) which explore the 
implications of relaxing this assumption in an environment where migration may occur in 
either direction but their analysis suggests that the discontinuities introduced in this 
extension will add considerable complexity.  An alternative, less complex, alternative is 
to assume that one of the regions is poor and the other rich so that migration always 
moves from the poor to the rich; see Woodland and Yashida (2006) for such an approach 
in the development literature.  While this assumption is theoretically attractive and may 
be tenable in the case of a dual developing economy, it is too restrictive in our case where 
migration may occur in either direction, depending on the nature of the initial shock, so 
we start with the simplest assumption of costless internal migration.  
 
2.2 The representative firm  
  10 
  The representative firm of region i operates with a production function of the 
form: 
(6)  ( )
i α
i i i i i Y D L /F i 1,2 0 α 1 = = < <  
where   Yi = real output of the representative firm, region i,  
  Di =  productivity parameter, region i, and  
  Fi  = the (exogenous) number of firms in region i.   
Given the assumption of decreasing returns to labour, competition will ensure that all 
firms are of equal size.  
  Real firm profits are given by: 
(7)  ΠFi  = Yi – Wi(Li/Fi)(1+Ti),    i = 1,2 
where Ti is the rate of payroll tax levied by the regional government in region i. 
We model the labour market using a “right-to-manage” bargaining framework in 
which the wage is determined by the bargaining of firms and unions after which the firms 
choose employment to maximise profits given the bargained wage.  The firm’s profit-
maximising employment condition is the usual marginal productivity condition: 
(8)  ( ) ( )
i α 1
i i i i i i α D L /F W 1 T
−
= +   i = 1,2 
conditional on the wage which emerges from the bargaining process. 
 
2.3 Wage determination 
  We assume that the wage in region i is determined by a process of negotiation 
between employers and trade unions. The union’s bargaining aim is to push the wage bill 
as high as possible relative to the figure they believe workers could obtain elsewhere in 
the region if the bargaining process breaks down.  In pursuing this aim, however, they are 
constrained by the bargaining aim of the employers which is to preserve profits.  We 
formalise this set of assumptions, following Layard et al. (1991), by supposing that the 
bargained wage is the outcome of the following optimisation problem: 
   
i Ω
i i i i i {W }
max B ( F) ((W -A )L )
i
= Π ,    0<Ωi<1 
subject to (6) and (7) where Ai is the income workers expect to be able to obtain 
elsewhere in region i if an agreement is not reached and  Ωi is a parameter representing  
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union strength in the bargaining process in region i.  We assume that Ai depends on both 
the expected wage in the rest of the region (W
e) as well as unemployment benefits (UB): 
  Ai = (1-Ui)W
e
i + Ui.UBi 
where (1-Ui) is taken as the probability of employment elsewhere and Ui the probability 
of unemployment, should the bargaining process break down.  We assume that in solving 
the bargaining problem both firms and unions are myopic in the sense that they both 
ignore the effects of wages on employment.  Under these assumptions, the first-order 
condition for the bargaining problem is: 
    Ωi (ΠFi) = (Wi-Ai)(1+Ti)Li 
Using the definition of Ai, the marginal productivity condition for profit maximisation, 
equation (8), and the assumption that in equilibrium the expected wage (W
e) is equal to 
the actual wage (W), the first-order condition can be rewritten as: 
(9)   Wi,/(Wi-UBi) = (αi/(1-αi))(1/Ωi)Ui   i = 1,2, 
so that there is a simple and plausible negative relationship between the equilibrium wage 
and the unemployment rate which is shifted up by an increase in union power as well as 
by an increase in the level of unemployment benefits.   
   
2.4 The regional government 
  The government of region i receives good i from the firms in its region in the 
form of receipts from a payroll tax which is levied at a constant rate in its region.  The 
regional government uses part of this revenue to pay unemployment benefits to 
unemployed households in its region and is assumed to convert the remainder costlessly 
into the government good which it provides to households in its region in equal per capita 
amounts.  We assume that the government of region i balances its budget so that total 
outlay and tax collections are equal.  This gives: 
  NiGRi + (Ni-Li).UBi = LiTiWi,     i = 1,2 
where GRi = the amount of (regional) government good provided per household, region i.   
Using the definition of the unemployment rate, Ui, we can write this condition as: 
(10)  GRi + Ui.UBi =  TiWi(1-Ui),     i = 1,2 
  For most of our simulations we will assume that the regional governments are 
exogenous, subject only to their budget constraint.  For the analysis of our last question,  
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however, we will assume that they behave strategically.  There are various goals they 
could pursue, including the maximisation of welfare (measured by the utility of the 
representative household) or the size of the government budget (as measured by 
expenditure, for example).  We will follow existing literature (see, e.g. Petchey, 1993, 
Petchey and Shapiro, 2000, 2002, and Groenewold et al., 2000, 2003) and assume that 
they are welfare maximisers.  In that case the government of region i chooses GRi, and Ti 
to maximise (1) subject to the constraint imposed by the regional economy as well as its 
own budget constraint, (10).  The first-order condition for this maximisation problem can 
be rewritten as: 
(11)    
1 1 2 2
1 2
0
i i i i i i
i i i i i i
C C G
C T C T G T
γ γ δ ∂ ∂ ∂
+ + =
∂ ∂ ∂
    i = 1,2 
where the partial derivatives with respect to Ti are multipliers implied by the economic 
structure as captured by the model and are assumed to be taken as given by the regional 
government.  Each regional government also takes the actions of the other as given so 
that the model solution has the characteristics of a Nash equilibrium in a two-person 
game. 
 
2.5 The national government 
  The national government collects income tax at a fixed rate, M, from all citizens.  
Its tax collections are MN1J1 from households in region 1 and MN2J2 from households in 
region 2.  Recall that the Ji are measured in terms of region i output.  We assume that the 
national government, like the regional governments, can transform each region’s output 
costlessly into the government good and, further, that the units of the goods are chosen so 
that one unit of each region’s good is converted into one unit of the government good.  
Under these assumptions we can write the national government’s total income tax 
receipts simply as MN1J1+ MN2J2 which it uses to provide output to the citizens of each 
region.  We allow expenditure per capita to differ across regions.  While central 
governments generally tax at the same rate in each region, their expenditure per capita 
often differs by region, in many cases as part of a fiscal equalisation arrangement to 
ensure that residents of poor regions have access to a reasonable level of government  
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services, despite low regional government revenue.  The output provided to households in 
region i is GFi per capita. The national government, too, balances its budget so that: 
(12)  N1GF1 + N2GF2 = M(N1J1 + N2J2).   
While there is an equalisation component in the unequal per capita expenditure levels in 
(12), we abstract from the more elaborate equalisation procedures which are common to 
federations such as Canada and Australia since in this paper we are not interested in them 
per se so that to introduce them would be to needlessly complicate the model. 
 
2.7 Model closure 
  As it stands, the model is incomplete in the sense that there are fewer equations 
than endogenous variables. We remedy this by adding various definitional equations and 
marker-clearing conditions which provide extra links between the variables we already 
have. 
  We begin with a relationship that defines real government-provided 
consumption per household in region i, Gi: 
(13)  Gi = GRi + GFi,   i = 1,2. 
  Next, national population (= labour force) is defined by: 
(14)  N1 + N2 = N, 
where N is the national population. 
  It is assumed that the representative firm in region i distributes all its profit to 
households in region i.  From this it follows that the representative household’s profits 
receipts (ΠHi) are related to firm profits (ΠFi) by the condition: 
(15)  Fi.ΠFi = Ni.ΠHi,    i = 1,2. 
Note that this excludes the possibility that firms in one region are owned by households 
in another and while this is undoubtedly unrealistic, it buys considerable simplicity since 
it reduces the interconnectedness between regions and allows us to focus on the links 
which result from inter-regional trade and migration.  Besides, it is unlikely that in 
practice cross-border firm ownership is an important channel of influence between 
regions. 
  Next, we have a market-clearing condition for the output market in each region: 
(16)  Fi.Yi = N1Ci1 + N2Ci2 + NiGRi + NiMJi,     i = 1,2.  
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This relationship simply states that output produced in region i is (i) consumed by 
households in the region, or (ii) traded to households in the other region and consumed by 
them, or (iii) paid to region i’s government to be converted to the government good, or 
(iv) paid to the national government as income tax and converted to the government 
good.  
  Finally, we have a balanced-trade assumption: since there are no assets in the 
mode, we cannot allow either region to consume in excess of its income.  Hence 
(17)  C21 = P.C12. 
  The model with exogenous regional governments consists of the 30 equations 
(1)-(10), (12)-(17) in 39 variables Vi, Cji, Gi, ΠHi, ΠFi,  Ui, Wi, UBi, P, Li, Ni, Fi, Yi, Ji, 
Ti, Ωi, GRi, GFi, N and M of which the 11 variables UBi, Fi, GRi, Ωi, GFi and N are 
exogenous. Thus there are 28 endogenous variables.  Two equations are redundant since 
equations (3), (4), (7), (10), (15) and (17) can be used to derive (16).  We therefore drop 
equations (16), leaving 28 equations in 28 endogenous variables and 11 exogenous 
variables. 
  To obtain the model with maximising regional governments we simply add the 
two equations (11) and shift GRi from the list of exogenous variables to the endogenous 
category.  
 
2.8 The short-run version of the model 
  We define “the short run” as the stretch of time before inter-regional migration 
begins to respond to inequality between V1 and V2.  Using this definition, we can define a 
short-run version of the model by deleting equations (5) and (14) from the model in each 
of its forms (whether exogenous or maximising regional governments) and transferring 
both N1 and N2 from the endogenous to the exogenous category.  We shall refer to it as 
the “short-run version of the model” and to the model itself as the “long-run version of 
the model”. 
 
3. The linearised numerical version of the model 
  While the structure of the two-region model set out in the previous section is 
relatively simple, it is non-linear in the levels of the variables and for this reason it cannot  
  15 
easily be used to conduct comparative-static exercises which will throw light on the topic 
of the present paper.  We circumvent this problem by using a numerical linearised 
version of the model which we briefly describe in this section. 
  To linearise the model of section 2 we use a process of log differentiation.  This  
converts the model from one which is non-linear in the levels to one which is linear in the 
proportional rates of change of the variables.  The resulting linearised versions of 
equations (1)-(17) are given in Appendix 2. 
  As can be seen from Appendix 2, the linearised model contains a number of 
parameters which have to be evaluated before the model can be simulated. These 
parameters fall into two groups.  The first are parameters which appear in model 
relationships; γji and δi appear in the utility function (1) and αi appears in the production 
function (6).  The remainder are linearisation parameters and are all shares of some sort. 
  The model parameters can be evaluated with the help of model restrictions.  Start 
with αi.  Here we use the marginal productivity condition, equation (8).  Similarly for γji 
and δi.  Here we follow the approach conventionally adopted by GE modellers and 
calibrate the utility function to ensure that the initial solution is one of utility 
maximisation.
4  Since the relative price of C and G is unity, utility maximisation implies 
that the ratio γji/δi is equal to Cji/Gi.  Then, using the restriction that γ1i + γ2i + δi = 1, we 
have  
  γji = Cji/(C1i+C2i+Gi) ,   
and  
  δi = Gi/(C1i+C2i+Gi).     
The linearisation parameters can be evaluated directly from their definitions, 
given values for M, ΠHi, Ji, Ui, Wi, Li, Ni, Ti, NiGFi, NiJi, GRi, Gi, Yi, and ΠFi.  All of 
which can be derived from data on Ci, GRi, LiWi, GFi, Wi, and Ni and the model 
definitions.
5  
                                                 
4 It should be noted that, while this parameterisation is conventional, it is not strictly implied by our model 
specification since in our framework households do not choose Gi but take it as given in maximising utility. 
5 Note that while the parameters σmaxji also fall into the linearisation category, they are not simply shares.  
They appear only in the version of the model with maximizing regional governments and they depend on 
the solutions to the GE version of the model which regional governments are assumed to take as given.  We 
therefore evaluate them by simulating the GE model with a tax increase and combine the effects on  
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All the model and linearization parameters have the subscript i = 1,2 so that they 
all have to be evaluated separately for regions 1 and 2.  The same applies to the data 
required for their evaluation.  To proceed with this evaluation, therefore, the regions need 
to be defined and appropriate data need to be obtained. 
We use Australian data, not because the model is particularly Australian in 
character or that we wish to comment on specifically Australian issues but simply for 
convenience’s sake.  This being the case, the most obvious way of defining the regions is 
in terms of the Australian states of which there are six: New South Wales, Victoria, 
Queensland, South Australia, Western Australia and Tasmania.  We take one of these as 
region 1 and the other five collectively as region 2.  Data for each of Ci, GRi, LiWi, GFi, 
Wi, and Ni are then obtained for each of the two regions thus defined.  The figures we use 
are the average values for the years 1994-95 to 1998-99.  These figures are given in 
Appendix 3. 
To avoid the possibility that the simulation results we are about to report were 
affected by our choice of the state for region 1, we carry out the above procedure six 
times with each of the six states taken as region 1 and the remainder collectively as 
region 2.  In this way we simulate six versions of the linearised model. 
 
4. Results 
  Recall that we will analyse five questions.  Briefly, they address: 
1.  the  effects  on  the  regional  economies  of  an  increase  in  immigration which  is 
distributed across regions in proportion to their populations; 
2.  the effects on regional economies of an increase in immigration which is directed 
at one region only; 
3.  the effectiveness of regional government tax and expenditure policies designed to 
alleviate the adverse regional effects of immigration increases; 
4.  the effectiveness of national expenditure policies designed to alleviate the adverse 
effects on one region of immigration increases; and 
                                                                                                                                               
consumption with other parameters as shown in the formulae Appendix 2.  It turns out that σmaxji is 
approximately 1 for i=j and zero otherwise so that the linearised condition effectively becomes gi = cii.  
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5.  the effectiveness of regional governments’ strategic behaviour in alleviating the 
adverse effects of immigration increases. 
 
We analyse each of these five questions in turn. 
 
4.1 Question 1 
  To address question 1 we shock national population by 1 with the assumption 
that the increase is spread across the two regions equi-proportionately in the short run.  
Since the model is solved in the proportional changes this simply requires us to set n1 and 
n2 equal to one for the short-run simulation and the value of n equal to one in the long-run 
simulation.  The results, for NSW as region 1 and the rest of the country as region 2, are 
reported in Table 1. The results are based on a closure assumption that taxes are 
exogenous and expenditure endogenous at both levels of government.  
 
[Table 1 near here] 
 
In the short run output in both regions increases although by less in region 2 which 
implies a greater fall in output per head and a greater fall in household income per capita 
in region 2 given that population increases by the same proportion in each region.  Both 
regions reduce consumption pre head of good 1 by the same proportion and similarly for 
good 2.  The fall in consumption of good 2 is larger than that of good 1 and since region 
2’s households consume relatively more of good 2, their consumption falls by more 
resulting in a larger reduction in utility (government expenditure is exogenous and 
unchanged).  Thus, in the short run, households in both regions are worse-off as a result 
of the immigration increase but households in region 2 fare worse than those in region 1.  
Both levels of government increase taxes to maintain a constant level of expenditure per 
capita for the larger population.  With the greater fall in the tax base in region 2, the 
required tax-rate increase is larger than it is in region 1.    
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  Results for each of the other states as region 1 are reported in the Table A4.11 in 
Appendix 4 and they show that the results in Table 1 above are dependent on the choice 
of region 1.  In particular, they depend on the value of αi (the exponent of labour in the 
production function in region i); the values of the αi are reported in the last two rows of 
Table A4.11.  From these it is clear that region i fares relatively better than region 2 if 
and only if its α value is greater.  The explanation is straightforward:  with the same 
increase in population in each region, the region with the larger α will have a larger 
increase in total output and therefore a smaller fall in per capita output, therefore a 
smaller fall in income, consumption and utility.   
  In the labour market, the initial effect is to increase the labour force which 
results in an “immediate” increase in unemployment which, in turn, puts downward 
pressure on the wage through the bargaining process.  Even though the results in Table 1 
show that the wage fall is larger in region 2, the rise in unemployment in region 2 is 
larger because of the smaller marginal product of labour which dampens the 
employment-increasing effect of the wage fall.  These relative effects on wages, 
employment and unemployment are again reversed if the relative magnitudes of the αs is 
reversed. 
  In the long run remarkably little changes.  Most of the action in response to the 
immigration intake is in the short run and allowing free and complete internal migration 
response does little to ameliorate the adverse effects of the immigration shock.  Since the 
fall in utility is larger in region 2, there is a population move to region 1 once migration is 
allowed but compared to the original intake, the effects are small, not surprisingly since 
both regions’ populations increase in the same proportion in the short run. 
  Thus, all in all, residents in both regions suffer as a result of the increase in 
immigration – wages, income, consumption and utility all fall and unemployment and 
taxes rise.  Which region suffers most depends on the marginal product of labour – the 
higher the marginal product, the smaller the drop in income, consumption and output and 
the smaller the rise in unemployment and taxes. 
  The closure assumption underlying the results in Table 1 are that taxes are 
endogenous and expenditure exogenous at both levels of government.  We also  
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experimented with alternatives, allowing first regional governments and then the national 
government to switch from endogenous taxes to endogenous expenditure.  The full 
results (for each state as region 1 in turn) are reported in Tables A4.12 and A4.13 in 
Appendix 4.  The overall conclusions reached above are unaffected by these changes in 
closure assumptions.  In all cases, output, consumption, income and welfare fall in both 
regions as a result of the immigration increase, with unemployment rising and taxes 
rising (or government expenditure falling). 
 
4.2 Question 2 
  Our second question deals with the effects on the two regions of an increase in 
immigration which occurs in only one region – region 1 in our case.  We analyse this by 
shocking population in region 1, N1, by 1/σn1 (σn1 is the share of region 1 in national 
population) and holding N2 constant in the short run and shocking national population, N, 
by 1 in the long run.  The magnitude of the short-run shock to N1 ensures that the 
population increases in the short and long runs are equal and, in  turn, equal to the 
immigration intake analysed in question 1.  The results of this shock are presented in 
Table 2 which has the same closure assumptions underlying it as did Table 1: endogenous 
taxes and exogenous government expenditures. 
 
[Table 2 about here ] 
 
  The short-run effects are quite different to those in the previous simulations but, 
as expected, the long-run effects are identical – in the long run it doesn’t matter were the 
immigrants arrive as long as there is free internal migration.  We focus our discussion, 
therefore, on the short-run effects. 
  The short-run effects on region 1 are similar to those in the question1 simulation 
reported in Table 1 except they are all larger – consumption, income, output per capita, 
wages and welfare all fall and unemployment and taxes increase.  The only noteworthy 
exception is that the national tax rate increases by less than in the case where the  
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immigrants are evenly spread around the country.  This reflects the fact that when NSW  
is region 1 α1>α2 so that in the current simulation the population increase is concentrated 
in the region with the higher marginal product of labour, the national output increases by 
more and this is reflected in the larger increase in the income tax base so that the tax rate 
needs to go up by less than if the immigrants are spread evenly over both regions.   
  While there are no direct population effects on region 2, some of the adverse 
effects of immigration in region 1 spill over into region 2 in the short run through relative 
price and inter-regional trade effects.  Since the initial effect of the immigration to region 
1 is to increase the demand for good 1 more than for good 2 (since region 1 consumes far 
more good 1 than good 2), p, the relative price of good 1 in terms of good 2 increases.   
This disadvantages region 2 which produces good 2 and they therefore suffer a small 
welfare loss. 
   In the long run inter-regional migration results in a large movement of people 
from region 1 to region 2 so transferring a roughly equal share of the overall welfare loss 
to region 2.       
  In summary, the increase in immigration has significant adverse effects on the 
region in which they arrive – both labour market and welfare outcomes deteriorate – but 
much of this is spread to the other region by internal migration in the long run.  Hence 
internal migration is an important channel by which the costs of immigration on the host 
region are shifted to other regions. 
  As with the simulation used to address question 1, we ran a number of further 
simulations to assess the sensitivity to parameter choice and closure assumptions. On 
parameter choice,  we ran the simulation reported in Table 2 for each other state being 
region 1 in turn.  They are all reported in Appendix 4, Table A4.21 and show that the 
inferences we drew from Table 2 do not depend on the assumption that NSW is region 1.  
Further, we also re-ran all six simulations for two different closure assumptions, first  
making regional government expenditures endogenous and taxes exogenous and then 
making national government expenditure endogenous and its tax rate exogenous.  The 
results are also reported in Appendix 4, in Tables A4.22 and A4.23.  They indicate that  
  21 




4.3 Question 3 
  We have seen in the previous two sub-sections that immigration results in 
substantial adverse effects on income, unemployment and welfare in both regions but 
especially in the region in which the immigration increase is concentrated.  It is not 
unreasonable, therefore, that regional governments may take policy action.  In this sub-
section we assume, as we did in the previous case, that the immigration increase is 
concentrated in region 1 and ask whether a tax cut by the government of region 1 can be 
used to offset the adverse effects on the region’s citizens.  To do this we run a simulation 
in which we increase population in region 1 by 1/αn1 while leaving N2 constant.  In 
addition we assume that region 1’s government increases its expenditure by 1.  The 
results are reported in Table 3. 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
  In the short run the government’s attempt to alleviate the adverse effects of 
immigration on labour market outcomes is a failure.  For region 1 wages, income, 
consumption and output per capita all fall by more and unemployment rises by more as a 
result of the government’s expenditure increase.  The effects on region 2 are smaller but 
also worse than those reported in Table 2.  Surprisingly, though, welfare actually falls 
less so that, while the policy is a failure from a labour-market point of view, it succeeds 
in improving the welfare of the representative citizen in region1 although region 2’s 
households are slightly worse-off.   
  The reason for this seemingly perverse effect is not hard to find and lies in the 
government’s budget constraint – the increase in expenditure by the government in region 
1 must be financed by an increase in payroll tax in that region and, not surprisingly, this 
has adverse consequences for the performance of the labour market.  The adverse effects 
are transmitted to region 2 via relative price effects.  
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  In the long run the ability to migrate leads to a movement of population from 
region 1 to region 2, thereby shifting some of the consequences to region 2.  As a result, 
region 2’s labour market performance worsens and its welfare falls further.  The effect of 
migration on region 1 is generally beneficial – the falls in income, wages and 
consumption are ameliorated and the unemployment rate improves a little.  Thus, in the 
long run the effect of migration is to spread the effects to region 2. 
  Similar simulations but with the other states as region 1 in turn are reported in 
Appendix 4, Table A4.31 and show that the outcomes just described are not dependent on 
the choice of NSW as region 1.   
  Another set of simulations is reported in Table A4.32 and is based on the 
assumption that the government in region 1 reacts to the adverse labour market effects of 
the immigration increased by cutting payroll taxes rather than by increasing expenditure.  
Given that the unexpected consequences of an expenditure increase are the result of 
adjustment via the government’s budget constraint,  it is not surprising that the effects of 
a tax cut are the opposite of those following an expenditure increase – the policy is 
successful in partially off-setting the effects of an immigration increase on labour market 
performance but does so at the cost of a larger fall in welfare so that in this sense the 
policy is self-defeating. 
  All in all, government policy is able to have a substantial short-run effect on the 
labour-market consequences of an immigration shock (although sometimes in an 
unexpected direction) but, in the long run, the welfare effects of the government 
intervention are very modest. 
 
4.4 Question 4 
  Here we evaluate whether the national government can alleviate the adverse 
effects of an immigration shock to region 1 by boosting its expenditure in region 1 while 
holding expenditure in region 2 constant and balancing its budget by adjusting the 
income tax rate.  The results of a simulation of this policy with NSW as region 1 are 
reported in Table 4; the results for each of the other states being chosen as region 1 in 
turn are reported in Appendix 4, Table A4.41. 
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[Table 4 near here] 
 
  The results provide an interesting comparison to those which follow from a 
regional government expenditure increase.  In the short run the effect of the national 
government intervention are slight – none on the labour market compared to the non-
intervention case reported in Table 2 and only a minor effect on welfare.  In the long run, 
however,  a comparison with Table 3 shows that the national government is much better 
at alleviating the labour market consequences of an immigration increase by increasing 
its expenditure than the regional government is.  While the welfare effects are more or 
less the same for each policy, the national government’s policy makes for significantly 
better labour market outcomes in both regions because it relies on the income tax rather 
than the payroll tax to balance its budget.  In our model, the income tax does not have 
distortionary effects while the payroll tax affects wages and employment choice. 
  On the whole, the governments are able to do little good by increasing 
expenditure in the region adversely affected by the immigration increase, especially in 
the long run.  At best, they are able to shift some of the burden to region 2. 
 
4.5 Question 5 
  We saw in the simulations for question 3 that the regional government, in using 
an expenditure boost to attempt to offset the labour market deterioration following an 
immigration increase, might be successful but at the expense of reduced welfare.  In our 
final set of simulations we progress from ad hoc policy responses of this type to 
assuming that regional governments choose their expenditure and tax policies so as to 
explicitly maximise the welfare of the representative household in their region.  In 
modelling terms, this has the consequence of adding two further equations to the model 
(a first-order condition for welfare maximisation for each region) and making the both 
regional government expenditures and taxes endogenous.   
  The effects of an increase in immigration to region 1 when NSW is region 1 are 
reported in Table 5 with the full set of simulations reported in Table A4.51 of Appendix 
4. 
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[Table 5 near here] 
 
  The results in Table 5 can usefully be compared to two other tables – Table 2 (no 
reaction by any government to the effects of immigration) and Table 3 (region 1’s 
government increases expenditure in response to the adverse effects of the immigration 
increase).
6  The first comparison shows that, in the short run, the fall in region 1’s welfare 
is actually larger with maximising regional governments than with exogenous 
governments although the reduction in region 2’s welfare is smaller.  This apparently 
paradoxical results (surely a maximising government can always do at least as well as an 
exogenous government since it is always free to hold expenditure constant) is explained 
by the fact that region 2’s government also optimises and this actually makes region 1 
worse-off; a re-run of this simulation with region 2’s government assumed exogenous 
shows that, indeed, region 1’s government does a little better in terms of the welfare of its 
representative citizen than an exogenous regional government would.  In the long run the 
change in utility is equalised across the two regions by inter-regional migration and falls 
by less in both regions than it does with exogenous regional governments so that 
maximising regional governments are unambiguously better in the long run. 
  The second comparison is to Table 3 which reports results for the case that region 
1’s government increases expenditure in an attempt to offset the adverse effects of the 
immigration flow into region 1.   This comparison produces the same paradox as the 
previous one did and can be resolved in the same way.  The introduction of maximising 
governments actually makes region 1 worse-off in the short run than if the governments 
did nothing but makes region 2 better-off and makes both regions better-off in the long 
run. 
  Finally, we also report the effects of an evenly-spread immigration increase in the 
face of maximising regional governments in Appendix 4, Table A4.52.   A comparison to 
the results in Table 2 shows that in this case the introduction of maximising regional 
                                                 
6 It will be noted that in Table 5 in the long run the change in welfare for both regions and the change in all 
four consumption variables (and the change in the government provided good) are all equal.  Moreover, 
income changes in both regions are equal and the relative price is constant.  An inspection of the full results 
in Table A4.51 and Table A4.52 shows that this is a general feature of the results in the present case of 
maximizing regional governments.  Some manipulation of equations (1’), (2’), (5’) and (11’) of Appendix 2 
proves that this is necessarily the case.  
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governments makes the citizens of both regions better-off in both short and long runs.  In 
addition, the labour-market outcomes are improved for both regions if their governments 
choose tax rates and expenditure levels to maximise welfare.     
  We can conclude, therefore, that, generally, welfare maximising regional 
governments deliver a better outcome for their region although a regional government 
acting alone without a response by the government of the other region may do better for 
its citizens if the immigration increase is concentrated in its region rather than evenly 
spread throughout the country. 
 
5. Conclusions 
  In this paper we have used a small two-region CGE model to analyse the effects 
on regional economies of immigration shocks.  We have investigated two different 
shocks, one where an increase in immigration is spread across the regions in proportion 
to their populations and the other where the increase occurs only in one region.  We have 
also considered these shocks with and without government intervention which attempts to 
alleviate the adverse effects of the shock.  In particular, we have considered the effects of 
the government of the affected region increasing expenditure or cutting taxes to offset the 
immigration effects as well as an attempt by the national government to shift expenditure 
to the adversely affected region.  Finally we analysed each type of shock in a situation 
where regional governments act strategically in that they choose the values of their 
expenditure and tax instruments so as to maximise the welfare of a representative 
regional citizen. 
  Several broad conclusions can be drawn.  First, an increase in immigration always 
has an adverse effect on the welfare of both regions, irrespective of the nature of the 
shock.   
  Secondly, without government intervention, the effects of each type of shock on 
the economy as a whole and on the labour market in particular, can be considered adverse 
– consumption, wages, income, output per capita all fall and the unemployment rate rises.   
  Thirdly, when the immigrants are evenly spread across the two regions, the 
adverse effects on the two regions are similar.  In the event that the immigrants are 
concentrated in one region, the short run effects fall more heavily on the region receiving  
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the immigrants but subsequent internal migration substantially spreads the effects to the 
other region.   
  Fourthly, government intervention may or may not help the situation.  Thus a 
regional government expenditure increase in the adversely affected region will improve 
labour market outcomes in the short run but reduce welfare while a tax cut has the 
opposite effects – it improves welfare but at the cost of poorer labour market outcomes.   
A national government expenditure shift to the affected region improves that region’s 
performance but at the expense of the other region’s welfare.   
  Finally, maximising regional governments generally make for smaller welfare 
losses although the outcomes may be worse for one region in the short run. 
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Table 1.  The effect of an evenly spread increase in immigration; NSW is region 1  
Solution value 
Variable  SR  LR 
v1  -0.2465  -0.2596 
v2  -0.2679  -0.2596 
c11  -0.3029  -0.3274 
c21  -0.3502  -0.3349 
c12  -0.3029  -0.3274 
c22  -0.3502  -0.3349 
j1  -0.2729  -0.2977 
j2  -0.3202  -0.3051 
πh1  -0.2669  -0.2911 
πh2  -0.3070  -0.2925 
w1  -0.2696  -0.2941 
w2  -0.3033  -0.2890 
u1  0.1288  0.1405 
u2  0.4796  0.4570 
l1  0.9919  1.0819 
l2  0.9648  0.9192 
n1  1.0000  1.0907 
n2  1.0000  0.9528 
y1  0.7769  0.8474 
y2  0.7425  0.7074 
t1  0.2890  0.3152 
t2  0.3876  0.3693 
m  0.3029  0.3004 
n  0.0000  1.0000 
p  -0.0473  -0.0075 
Note: the shock and closure underlying this simulation is given by: n1= n2 = 1 in the short run and n = 1 in 
the long run; endogenous: t1, t2, m; exogenous: gr1 = gr2 = gf1 = gf2 = 0. 
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Table 2.  The effect of an increase in immigration to region 1; NSW is region 1  
Solution value 
Variable  SR  LR 
v1  -0.5233  -0.2596 
v2  -0.0911  -0.2596 
c11  -0.8225  -0.3274 
c21  -0.0249  -0.3349 
c12  -0.8225  -0.3274 
c22  -0.0249  -0.3349 
j1  -0.7977  -0.2977 
j2  0.0000  -0.3051 
πh1  -0.7800  -0.2911 
πh2  0.0000  -0.2925 
w1  -0.7880  -0.2941 
w2  0.0000  -0.2890 
u1  0.3764  0.1405 
u2  0.0000  0.4570 
l1  2.8990  1.0819 
l2  0.0000  0.9192 
n1  2.9228  1.0907 
n2  0.0000  0.9528 
y1  2.2708  0.8474 
y2  0.0000  0.7074 
t1  0.8446  0.3152 
t2  0.0000  0.3693 
m  0.2510  0.3004 
n  0.0000  1.0000 
p  0.7977  -0.0075 
Note: the shock and closure underlying this simulation is given by: n1=1/σn1, n2=0 in the short run and n = 1 
  in the long run; endogenous: t1, t2, m; exogenous: gr1 = gr2 = gf1 = gf2 = 0.  
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Table 3.  The effect of an increase in immigration to region 1 combined with an 
expenditure increase by region 1’s government; NSW is region 1  
Solution value 
Variable  SR  LR 
v1  -0.4947  -0.2602 
v2  -0.1102  -0.2602 
c11  -0.9906  -0.5502 
c21  -0.0308  -0.3066 
c12  -0.9906  -0.5502 
c22  -0.0308  -0.3066 
g1  0.6433  0.6433 
j1  -0.9598  -0.5150 
j2  0.0000  -0.2714 
πh1  -0.7847  -0.3498 
πh2  0.0000  -0.2602 
w1  -1.0027  -0.5633 
w2  0.0000  -0.2571 
u1  0.4789  0.2691 
u2  0.0000  0.4065 
l1  2.8926  1.2760 
l2  0.0000  0.8178 
n1  2.9228  1.2930 
n2  0.0000  0.8476 
y1  2.2657  0.9995 
y2  0.0000  0.6293 
t1  1.9874  1.5164 
t2  0.0000  0.3285 
m  0.3105  0.3544 
p  0.9598  0.2436 
Note: the shock and closure underlying this simulation is given by: n1=1/σn1, n2=0, gr1 = 1 in the short run 
and n = 1 and gr1 = 1 in the long run; endogenous: t1, t2, m; exogenous: gr1, gr2 = gf1 = gf2 = 0. 
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Table 4.  The effect of an increase in immigration to region 1 combined with an 
expenditure increase by the national government; NSW is region 1  
Solution value 
Variable  SR  LR 
v1  -0.4756  -0.2576 
v2  -0.1182  -0.2576 
c11  -0.8574  -0.4480 
c21  -0.0598  -0.3162 
c12  -0.8574  -0.4480 
c22  -0.0598  -0.3162 
g1  0.3567  0.3567 
j1  -0.7977  -0.3841 
j2  0.0000  -0.2524 
πh1  -0.7800  -0.3756 
πh2  0.0000  -0.2419 
w1  -0.7880  -0.3795 
w2  0.0000  -0.2390 
u1  0.3764  0.1813 
u2  0.0000  0.3779 
l1  2.8990  1.3962 
l2  0.0000  0.7602 
n1  2.9228  1.4076 
n2  0.0000  0.7880 
y1  2.2708  1.0936 
y2  0.0000  0.5851 
t1  0.8446  0.4068 
t2  0.0000  0.3054 
m  0.6034  0.6443 
p  0.7977  0.1318 
Note: the shock and closure underlying this simulation is given by: n1=1/σn1, n2=0, gf1 = 1 in the short run 
and n = 1 and gf1 = 1 in the long run; endogenous: t1, t2, m; exogenous: gf1, gf2 = gr1 = gr2 = 0. 
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Table 5.  The effect of an increase in immigration to region 1 when regional governments 
are welfare maximisers; NSW is region 1  
Solution value 
Variable  SR  LR 
v1  -0.5507  -0.2528 
v2  -0.0718  -0.2528 
c11  -0.6532  -0.2528 
c21  -0.0127  -0.2528 
c12  -0.6532  -0.2528 
c22  -0.0127  -0.2528 
j1  -0.6346  -0.2301 
j2  0.0059  -0.2301 
πh1  -0.7751  -0.2855 
πh2  0.0006  -0.2866 
w1  -0.5721  -0.2059 
w2  0.0074  -0.1931 
u1  0.2733  0.0984 
u2  -0.0117  0.3053 
l1  2.9055  1.0706 
l2  0.0009  0.9376 
n1  2.9228  1.0768 
n2  0.0000  0.9601 
y1  2.2759  0.8386 
y2  0.0007  0.7216 
gr1  -1.0054  -0.3929 
gr2  -0.0296  -0.3908 
t1  -0.3043  -0.1379 
t2  -0.0365  -0.1100 
m  0.1875  0.2285 
p  0.6405  0.0000 
Nχote: the shock and closure underlying this simulation is given by: n1=1/σn1, n2=0, in the short run and n = 
1 in the long run; endogenous: t1, t2, m, gr1, gr2; exogenous: gf1 = gf2 = 0. 
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Appendix 1: A list of variables 
  Vi  =  utility of the representative household, region i, 
  C1i  =  real private consumption of good 1 per household, region i, 
  C2i  =  real private consumption of good 2 per household, region i, 
  Gi  =  real government-provided consumption per household, region i, 
   M   = rate of national government income tax, 
  P   = price of good 1 in terms of good 2,  
  Ji   = real household income in region i, 
  ΠHi = real profit distribution per household, region i, 
  Wi* = real wage income per household, region i, 
  Ui   = unemployment rate, region i, 
  UBi = real unemployment benefits per unemployed person, region i, 
  Wi,  = real wage per worker, region i,   
  Li   = employment, in region i,  
  Ni   = workforce (= population), region i,  
   Yi = output of the representative firm, region i,  
  Di =  productivity parameter, region i,   
  Fi  = the (exogenous) number of firms in region i,  
  ΠFi = real profit pre firm, region i, 
  Ti   = rate of payroll tax levied by the regional government, region i, 
  Ai   = income workers expect to be able to obtain elsewhere, region i,  
  UBi = unemployment benefits, region i, 
  W
e
i = expected wage, region i, 
  GRi = amount of regional government good provided per household, region i,  
  GFi  =amount of national government output provided per household, region i, 
  N   = national population.   
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Appendix 2: The linearised version of the model 
 
The linearised form of the model is: 
(1’)  i 1i 1i 2i 2i i i v c c g = γ + γ +δ         i = 1,2 
where lower-case letters represent the proportional changes (log differentials) of their 
upper-case counterparts. 
(2’)   cji = -σmm + ji + (j-i)p,         i, j = 1,2 
where σm = M/(1-M) 
(3’)   ji = σjπhiπhi + (σjubi – σjuwiσui)ui + σjuwiwi + σjubiubi,  i = 1,2 
where σjπhi = ΠHi/Ji, σuwi = Wi(1-Ui)/Ji, σjubi = UiUBi/Ji, σui = Ui/(1-Ui) 
(4’)  ui = (1/σui)(ni-li)          i = 1,2 
(5’)   v1 = v2  
(6’)   yi = di + αi(li – fi),           i = 1,2 
(7’)   πfi = σπfyi yi - σπfwi(σtiti + li – fi + wi),     i = 1,2 
(8’)   di + (αi-1)(li – fi) = wi + σtiti,        i = 1,2 
(9’)  wi – σwwubiwi + σubwubiubi – ui = 0,     i = 1,2 
where σwwubi = Wi/(Wi-UBi), σubwubi = UBi/(Wi-UBi) 
(10’)  (σui + σgrubi)ui + wi + ti – σgrgrigri – σgrubiubi = 0,  i = 1,2 
where σgrgri = GRi/(GRi+UiUBi), σgrubi = UiUBi/(GRi+UiUBi), i = 1,2 
(11’)   gi = σmax1ic1i + σmax2ic2i,        i = 1,2 
where σmaxji = (-γji(∂Cji/∂Ti)/Cji)/(-γ1i(∂C1i/∂Ti)/C1i-γ2i(∂C2i/∂Ti)/C2i) 
(12’)  (σgf1-σj1)n1 + (σgf2-σj2)n2 + σgf1gf1 +σgf2gf2 – m –σj1j1 –σj2j2 = 0, 
(13’)  gi = σggrigri + σggfigfi   i = 1,2 
where σggri = GRi/Gi, σggfi = GFi/Gi. 
(14’)  σn1 + σn2 = n, 
where σni = Ni/N 
(15’)   fi + πfi – ni – πhi = 0 
(16’)  fi + yi = σyci1(n1 + ci1) + σyci2(n2 + ci2) + σygri(ni + gri) + σymji(ni + ji + m),  
            i = 1,2 
where σycij=NjCij/FiYi, σygri=NiGRi/FiYi, σymji=NiMJi/FiYi 
(17’)  c21 = p + c12   
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  Equations (1´)-(10’), (12’)-(17´) constitute a linear system of 30 equation in the 
28  endogenous  variables:  vi,    cij,  gi,  πhi,  πfi,  ui,  wi,  li,  ni,  p,  yi,  ji,  ti  and  m  and  the 
exogenous variables gri and gfi, ubi, fi, di and n. Two equations are redundant and we 
drop equations (16’). 
  When maximising regional governments are added to the model the two 
equations (11’) are added to the 30 above and the gri become endogenous. 
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Appendix 3: Data-Base 
 
  Total corresponding to           
  C ($m)  GR ($m)  LW ($m)  GF ($m)  W ($’000)  L ( ‘000)  Y/L ($’000) 
Region 1 NSW  112265.4  20189.8  92160.8  -192.3  32.8618  2804.5  47.2295 
Region 2 ROC  195152.8  36096.6  15227.8  192.3  29.0498  5343.5  43.2768 
Nation  307418.2  56286.4  247388.6  0.0  30.3619  8148  44.6373 
Region 1 Vic  80040.8  13545.4  65680.6  -686.9  31.3078  2097.9  44.6095 
Region 2 ROC  227377.4  42741  181708  686.9  30.0339  6050.1  44.6469 
Nation  307418.2  56286.4  247388.6  0.0  30.3619  8148  44.6373 
Region 1 Qld  55026  9662.6  42041.6  -83.3  27.2096  1545.1  41.8669 
Region 2 ROC  252392.2  46623.8  205347  83.3  31.0995  6602.9  45.2856 
Nation  307418.2  56286.4  247388.6  0.0  30.3619  8148  44.6373 
Region 1 SA  23339.2  4906.8  18088.6  826.0  27.7773  651.2  43.3753 
Region 2 ROC  284079  51379.6  229300  -826.0  30.5864  7496.8  44.7469 
Nation  307418.2  56286.4  247388.6  0.0  30.3619  8148  44.6373 
Region 1 WA  29616  6259.6  24236.8  -383.0  28.4236  852.7  42.0729 
Region 2 ROC  277802.2  50026.8  223151.8  383.0  30.5884  7295.3  44.9370 
Nation  307418.2  56286.4  247388.6  0.0  30.3619  8148  44.6373 
Region 1 Tas  7130.8  1722.2  5180.2  519.4  26.3489  196.6  45.0305 
Region 2 ROC  300287.4  54564.2  242208.4  -519.4  30.4611  7951.4  44.6276 
Nation  307418.2  56286.4  247388.6  0.0  30.3619  8148  44.6373 
  Sources:  Ci, Li, LWi and GRi are from ABS times series averaged over the period 1994/95 - 1998/99.  Time-series data on interstate imports are not 
reported by the ABS so that in each case C11 was set at 80% of C1 and C21 at 20% of C1.  C12 was then chosen to ensure a zero balance of trade in the 
initial equilibrium and C22 was chosen as C2 – C12.  GFi is computed as Li (MGFi/Li - MGF/L) where MGFi is final consumption expenditure by the 
national government plus grants to state i.  All other data are calculated from these figures to ensure that the model constraints hold:  L = L1 + L2, Wi 
= WiLi/Li, Yi = GRi + Ci, Gi = GRi+GFi, Ti = GRi/WiLi.  It should be noted that, as the model excludes investment and net overseas exports, Yi will 
not conform with official figures.  Pi was set at 1 for each i in the initial equilibrium.  
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Appendix 4: Full Simulation Results 
 
Table A4.11 Question 1, version 1: n1=n2=1; endogenous: t1, t2, m; exogenous: gr1, gr2, gf1, gf2  
NSW as region 1  Vic as region 1  Qld as region 1  SA as region 1  WA as region 1  Tas as region 1 
Variable  SR  LR  SR  LR  SR  LR  SR  LR  SR  LR  SR  LR 
v1  -0.2465  -0.2596  -0.2468  -0.2607  -0.2725  -0.2615  -0.2955  -0.2629  -0.2192  -0.2609  -0.3153  -0.2641 
v2  -0.2679  -0.2596  -0.2664  -0.2607  -0.2590  -0.2615  -0.2608  -0.2629  -0.2684  -0.2609  -0.2633  -0.2641 
c11  -0.3029  -0.3274  -0.3053  -0.3299  -0.3565  -0.3376  -0.3992  -0.3452  -0.2717  -0.3426  -0.4426  -0.3568 
c21  -0.3502  -0.3349  -0.3446  -0.3349  -0.3297  -0.3339  -0.3321  -0.3357  -0.3442  -0.3329  -0.3361  -0.3375 
c12  -0.3029  -0.3274  -0.3053  -0.3299  -0.3565  -0.3376  -0.3992  -0.3452  -0.2717  -0.3426  -0.4426  -0.3568 
c22  -0.3502  -0.3349  -0.3446  -0.3349  -0.3297  -0.3339  -0.3321  -0.3357  -0.3442  -0.3329  -0.3361  -0.3375 
j1  -0.2729  -0.2977  -0.2752  -0.2998  -0.3264  -0.3075  -0.3689  -0.3150  -0.2413  -0.3126  -0.4121  -0.3264 
j2  -0.3202  -0.3051  -0.3145  -0.3048  -0.2996  -0.3038  -0.3017  -0.3055  -0.3138  -0.3029  -0.3056  -0.3071 
πh1  -0.2669  -0.2911  -0.2720  -0.2963  -0.3133  -0.2953  -0.3352  -0.2862  -0.2529  -0.3277  -0.3660  -0.2899 
πh2  -0.3070  -0.2925  -0.3012  -0.2920  -0.2893  -0.2933  -0.2926  -0.2962  -0.3009  -0.2905  -0.2951  -0.2965 
w1  -0.2696  -0.2941  -0.2703  -0.2945  -0.3218  -0.3033  -0.3754  -0.3205  -0.2320  -0.3006  -0.4238  -0.3357 
w2  -0.3033  -0.2890  -0.2986  -0.2894  -0.2844  -0.2884  -0.2854  -0.2890  -0.2980  -0.2877  -0.2896  -0.2910 
u1  0.1288  0.1405  0.1372  0.1495  0.2105  0.1983  0.2549  0.2177  0.1343  0.1740  0.3181  0.2519 
u2  0.4796  0.4570  0.4638  0.4495  0.4320  0.4381  0.4372  0.4426  0.4580  0.4421  0.4452  0.4474 
l1  0.9919  1.0819  0.9909  1.0796  0.9828  0.9260  0.9802  0.8370  0.9909  1.2839  0.9697  0.7681 
l2  0.9648  0.9192  0.9670  0.9373  0.9710  0.9847  0.9697  0.9818  0.9679  0.9344  0.9691  0.9739 
n1  1.0000  1.0907  1.0000  1.0895  1.0000  0.9423  1.0000  0.8539  1.0000  1.2957  1.0000  0.7921 
n2  1.0000  0.9528  1.0000  0.9692  1.0000  1.0141  1.0000  1.0124  1.0000  0.9654  1.0000  1.0049 
y1  0.7769  0.8474  0.7757  0.8452  0.7396  0.6969  0.7056  0.6025  0.8135  1.0541  0.6779  0.5370 
y2  0.7425  0.7074  0.7462  0.7232  0.7568  0.7675  0.7555  0.7649  0.7449  0.7191  0.7523  0.7561 
t1  0.2890  0.3152  0.2927  0.3189  0.3637  0.3427  0.4205  0.3591  0.2532  0.3280  0.4892  0.3875 
t2  0.3876  0.3693  0.3767  0.3651  0.3533  0.3582  0.3580  0.3625  0.3751  0.3621  0.3635  0.3653 
m  0.3029  0.3004  0.3042  0.3038  0.3044  0.3038  0.3067  0.3056  0.3070  0.3024  0.3079  0.3068 
n  0.0000  1.0000  0.0000  1.0000  0.0000  1.0000  0.0000  1.0000  0.0000  1.0000  0.0000  1.0000 
p  -0.0473  -0.0075  -0.0393  -0.0050  0.0268  0.0038  0.0671  0.0095  -0.0725  0.0097  0.1065  0.0193 
α1  0.7833    0.7829    0.7526    0.7198    0.8210    0.6991   
α2  0.7696    0.7716    0.7794    0.7791    0.7696    0.7763   
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Table A4.12 Question 1, version 2: n1=n2=1; exogenous: m, gr1, gr2; endogenous: gf1=gf2=gf, t1, t2  
NSW as region 1  Vic as region 1  Qld as region 1  SA as region 1  WA as region 1  Tas as region 1 
Variable  SR  LR  SR  LR  SR  LR  SR  LR  SR  LR  SR  LR 
v1  -0.2580  -0.2722  -0.2557  -0.2693  -0.2794  -0.2669  -0.2986  -0.2649  -0.2203  -0.2631  -0.3195  -0.2647 
v2  -0.2814  -0.2722  -0.2748  -0.2693  -0.2642  -0.2669  -0.2628  -0.2649  -0.2709  -0.2631  -0.2639  -0.2647 
c11  -0.2729  -0.3000  -0.2752  -0.2991  -0.3264  -0.3052  -0.3689  -0.3130  -0.2413  -0.3146  -0.4121  -0.3202 
c21  -0.3202  -0.3037  -0.3145  -0.3051  -0.2996  -0.3043  -0.3017  -0.3056  -0.3138  -0.3027  -0.3056  -0.3072 
c12  -0.2729  -0.3000  -0.2752  -0.2991  -0.3264  -0.3052  -0.3689  -0.3130  -0.2413  -0.3146  -0.4121  -0.3202 
c22  -0.3202  -0.3037  -0.3145  -0.3051  -0.2996  -0.3043  -0.3017  -0.3056  -0.3138  -0.3027  -0.3056  -0.3072 
g1  -0.1668  -0.1653  -0.1540  -0.1539  -0.1352  -0.1349  -0.1129  -0.1125  -0.1042  -0.1026  -0.1077  -0.1073 
g2  -0.1652  -0.1638  -0.1444  -0.1442  -0.1324  -0.1322  -0.1184  -0.1180  -0.1213  -0.1195  -0.1121  -0.1116 
j1  -0.2729  -0.3000  -0.2752  -0.2991  -0.3264  -0.3052  -0.3689  -0.3130  -0.2413  -0.3146  -0.4121  -0.3202 
j2  -0.3202  -0.3037  -0.3145  -0.3051  -0.2996  -0.3043  -0.3017  -0.3056  -0.3138  -0.3027  -0.3056  -0.3072 
πh1  -0.2669  -0.2933  -0.2720  -0.2956  -0.3133  -0.2930  -0.3352  -0.2845  -0.2529  -0.3297  -0.3660  -0.2844 
πh2  -0.3070  -0.2912  -0.3012  -0.2922  -0.2893  -0.2939  -0.2926  -0.2963  -0.3009  -0.2902  -0.2951  -0.2966 
w1  -0.2696  -0.2964  -0.2703  -0.2938  -0.3218  -0.3010  -0.3754  -0.3185  -0.2320  -0.3025  -0.4238  -0.3293 
w2  -0.3033  -0.2877  -0.2986  -0.2896  -0.2844  -0.2888  -0.2854  -0.2891  -0.2980  -0.2874  -0.2896  -0.2911 
u1  0.1288  0.1416  0.1372  0.1491  0.2105  0.1968  0.2549  0.2163  0.1343  0.1751  0.3181  0.2472 
u2  0.4796  0.4549  0.4638  0.4499  0.4320  0.4389  0.4372  0.4428  0.4580  0.4417  0.4452  0.4476 
l1  0.9919  1.0903  0.9909  1.0771  0.9828  0.9190  0.9802  0.8319  0.9909  1.2920  0.9697  0.7536 
l2  0.9648  0.9150  0.9670  0.9381  0.9710  0.9864  0.9697  0.9822  0.9679  0.9335  0.9691  0.9743 
n1  1.0000  1.0992  1.0000  1.0870  1.0000  0.9351  1.0000  0.8487  1.0000  1.3038  1.0000  0.7771 
n2  1.0000  0.9484  1.0000  0.9701  1.0000  1.0158  1.0000  1.0128  1.0000  0.9645  1.0000  1.0053 
y1  0.7769  0.8540  0.7757  0.8432  0.7396  0.6916  0.7056  0.5988  0.8135  1.0607  0.6779  0.5268 
y2  0.7425  0.7042  0.7462  0.7239  0.7568  0.7688  0.7555  0.7652  0.7449  0.7184  0.7523  0.7563 
gf  -0.4677  -0.4636  -0.4142  -0.4138  -0.3751  -0.3743  -0.3328  -0.3316  -0.3373  -0.3321  -0.3159  -0.3147 
t1  0.2890  0.3176  0.2927  0.3181  0.3637  0.3401  0.4205  0.3569  0.2532  0.3301  0.4892  0.3802 
t2  0.3876  0.3676  0.3767  0.3654  0.3533  0.3588  0.3580  0.3626  0.3751  0.3617  0.3635  0.3655 
p  -0.0473  -0.0037  -0.0393  -0.0060  0.0268  0.0009  0.0671  0.0074  -0.0725  0.0119  0.1065  0.0130 
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Table A4.13 Question 1, version 3: n1=n2=1, exogenous: t1, t2, m; endogenous: gr1, gr2, gf1, gf2 with gf1=gf2=gf   
NSW as region 1  Vic as region 1  Qld as region 1  SA as region 1  WA as region 1  Tas as region 1 
Variable  SR  LR  SR  LR  SR  LR  SR  LR  SR  LR  SR  LR 
v1  -0.2503  -0.2647  -0.2487  -0.2627  -0.2754  -0.2618  -0.2970  -0.2590  -0.2151  -0.2571  -0.3187  -0.2593 
v2  -0.2737  -0.2647  -0.2681  -0.2627  -0.2589  -0.2618  -0.2566  -0.2590  -0.2643  -0.2571  -0.2584  -0.2593 
c11  -0.2319  -0.2532  -0.2338  -0.2533  -0.2702  -0.2523  -0.3013  -0.2526  -0.1982  -0.2536  -0.3272  -0.2522 
c21  -0.2581  -0.2457  -0.2547  -0.2474  -0.2450  -0.2489  -0.2463  -0.2497  -0.2562  -0.2478  -0.2492  -0.2505 
c12  -0.2319  -0.2532  -0.2338  -0.2533  -0.2702  -0.2523  -0.3013  -0.2526  -0.1982  -0.2536  -0.3272  -0.2522 
c22  -0.2581  -0.2457  -0.2547  -0.2474  -0.2450  -0.2489  -0.2463  -0.2497  -0.2562  -0.2478  -0.2492  -0.2505 
g1  -0.2995  -0.3134  -0.2884  -0.3020  -0.3107  -0.2972  -0.3192  -0.2821  -0.2324  -0.2722  -0.3397  -0.2815 
g2  -0.3388  -0.3280  -0.3209  -0.3151  -0.3050  -0.3079  -0.2904  -0.2926  -0.2981  -0.2901  -0.2903  -0.2909 
j1  -0.2319  -0.2532  -0.2338  -0.2533  -0.2702  -0.2523  -0.3013  -0.2526  -0.1982  -0.2536  -0.3272  -0.2522 
j2  -0.2581  -0.2457  -0.2547  -0.2474  -0.2450  -0.2489  -0.2463  -0.2497  -0.2562  -0.2478  -0.2492  -0.2505 
πh1  -0.2656  -0.2901  -0.2706  -0.2932  -0.3104  -0.2899  -0.3316  -0.2780  -0.2513  -0.3215  -0.3600  -0.2774 
πh2  -0.3004  -0.2861  -0.2952  -0.2867  -0.2842  -0.2888  -0.2872  -0.2911  -0.2952  -0.2856  -0.2895  -0.2911 
w1  -0.2153  -0.2351  -0.2155  -0.2335  -0.2442  -0.2280  -0.2761  -0.2315  -0.1778  -0.2274  -0.2945  -0.2270 
w2  -0.2244  -0.2137  -0.2228  -0.2164  -0.2158  -0.2192  -0.2159  -0.2188  -0.2248  -0.2175  -0.2185  -0.2197 
u1  0.1028  0.1123  0.1094  0.1185  0.1597  0.1491  0.1875  0.1572  0.1029  0.1317  0.2211  0.1704 
u2  0.3549  0.3379  0.3460  0.3361  0.3278  0.3331  0.3307  0.3352  0.3455  0.3342  0.3359  0.3377 
l1  0.9935  1.0849  0.9927  1.0754  0.9869  0.9215  0.9855  0.8262  0.9931  1.2703  0.9789  0.7545 
l2  0.9739  0.9273  0.9754  0.9475  0.9780  0.9938  0.9771  0.9905  0.9758  0.9439  0.9767  0.9820 
n1  1.0000  1.0920  1.0000  1.0833  1.0000  0.9337  1.0000  0.8384  1.0000  1.2792  1.0000  0.7707 
n2  1.0000  0.9522  1.0000  0.9713  1.0000  1.0161  1.0000  1.0137  1.0000  0.9673  1.0000  1.0054 
y1  0.7782  0.8498  0.7772  0.8419  0.7428  0.6935  0.7094  0.5947  0.8153  1.0429  0.6844  0.5275 
y2  0.7495  0.7136  0.7527  0.7311  0.7623  0.7746  0.7612  0.7717  0.7510  0.7264  0.7582  0.7624 
gr1  -0.2529  -0.2761  -0.2583  -0.2798  -0.3126  -0.2919  -0.3436  -0.2880  -0.2131  -0.2726  -0.3823  -0.2946 
gr2  -0.3142  -0.2992  -0.3110  -0.3021  -0.3036  -0.3085  -0.3008  -0.3049  -0.3109  -0.3007  -0.3084  -0.3100 
gf1  -0.3837  -0.3806  -0.3394  -0.3394  -0.3075  -0.3066  -0.2717  -0.2705  -0.2755  -0.2714  -0.2573  -0.2562 
p  -0.0262  0.0075  -0.0209  0.0059  0.0253  0.0034  0.0550  0.0029  -0.0579  0.0058  0.0781  0.0017 
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Table A4.21 Question 2 version 1: n1=1/σ1, n2=0; endogenous: m, t1, t2; exogenous: gr1, gr2, gf1, gf2  
NSW as region 1  Vic as region 1  Qld as region 1  SA as region 1  WA as region 1  Tas as region 1 
Variable  SR  LR  SR  LR  SR  LR  SR  LR  SR  LR  SR  LR 
v1  -0.5233  -0.2596  -0.7007  -0.2607  -1.0613  -0.2615  -2.9202  -0.2629  -1.4246  -0.2609  -10.6874  -0.2641 
v2  -0.0911  -0.2596  -0.0824  -0.2607  -0.0839  -0.2615  -0.0906  -0.2629  -0.0511  -0.2609  -0.1033  -0.2641 
c11  -0.8225  -0.3274  -1.1044  -0.3299  -1.7008  -0.3376  -4.7564  -0.3452  -2.3207  -0.3426  -17.8388  -0.3568 
c21  -0.0249  -0.3349  -0.0291  -0.3349  -0.0341  -0.3339  -0.0395  -0.3357  -0.0174  -0.3329  -0.0530  -0.3375 
c12  -0.8225  -0.3274  -1.1044  -0.3299  -1.7008  -0.3376  -4.7564  -0.3452  -2.3207  -0.3426  -17.8388  -0.3568 
c22  -0.0249  -0.3349  -0.0291  -0.3349  -0.0341  -0.3339  -0.0395  -0.3357  -0.0174  -0.3329  -0.0530  -0.3375 
j1  -0.7977  -0.2977  -1.0753  -0.2998  -1.6667  -0.3075  -4.7169  -0.3150  -2.3034  -0.3126  -17.7859  -0.3264 
j2  0.0000  -0.3051  0.0000  -0.3048  0.0000  -0.3038  0.0000  -0.3055  0.0000  -0.3029  0.0000  -0.3071 
πh1  -0.7800  -0.2911  -1.0627  -0.2963  -1.6001  -0.2953  -4.2864  -0.2862  -2.4143  -0.3277  -15.7978  -0.2899 
πh2  0.0000  -0.2925  0.0000  -0.2920  0.0000  -0.2933  0.0000  -0.2962  0.0000  -0.2905  0.0000  -0.2965 
w1  -0.7880  -0.2941  -1.0562  -0.2945  -1.6435  -0.3033  -4.8001  -0.3205  -2.2150  -0.3006  -18.2917  -0.3357 
w2  0.0000  -0.2890  0.0000  -0.2894  0.0000  -0.2884  0.0000  -0.2890  0.0000  -0.2877  0.0000  -0.2910 
u1  0.3764  0.1405  0.5360  0.1495  1.0747  0.1983  3.2596  0.2177  1.2822  0.1740  13.7279  0.2519 
u2  0.0000  0.4570  0.0000  0.4495  0.0000  0.4381  0.0000  0.4426  0.0000  0.4421  0.0000  0.4474 
l1  2.8990  1.0819  3.8717  1.0796  5.0188  0.9260  12.5353  0.8370  9.4603  1.2839  41.8552  0.7681 
l2  0.0000  0.9192  0.0000  0.9373  0.0000  0.9847  0.0000  0.9818  0.0000  0.9344  0.0000  0.9739 
n1  2.9228  1.0907  3.9074  1.0895  5.1067  0.9423  12.7883  0.8539  9.5468  1.2957  43.1632  0.7921 
n2  0.0000  0.9528  0.0000  0.9692  0.0000  1.0141  0.0000  1.0124  0.0000  0.9654  0.0000  1.0049 
y1  2.2708  0.8474  3.0311  0.8452  3.7771  0.6969  9.0234  0.6025  7.7666  1.0541  29.2620  0.5370 
y2  0.0000  0.7074  0.0000  0.7232  0.0000  0.7675  0.0000  0.7649  0.0000  0.7191  0.0000  0.7561 
t1  0.8446  0.3152  1.1436  0.3189  1.8575  0.3427  5.3780  0.3591  2.4167  0.3280  21.1170  0.3875 
t2  0.0000  0.3693  0.0000  0.3651  0.0000  0.3582  0.0000  0.3625  0.0000  0.3621  0.0000  0.3653 
m  0.2510  0.3004  0.2936  0.3038  0.3446  0.3038  0.3982  0.3056  0.1751  0.3024  0.5347  0.3068 
n  0.0000  1.0000  0.0000  1.0000  0.0000  1.0000  0.0000  1.0000  0.0000  1.0000  0.0000  1.0000 
p  0.7977  -0.0075  1.0753  -0.0050  1.6667  0.0038  4.7169  0.0095  2.3034  0.0097  17.7859  0.0193 
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 Table A4.22 Question 2, version 2: n1=1/σ1, n2=0; exogenous: m, gr1, gr2; endogenous: t1, t2, gf1, gf2 with gf1=gf2=gf  
NSW as region 1  Vic as region 1  Qld as region 1  SA as region 1  WA as region 1  Tas as region 1 
Variable  SR  LR  SR  LR  SR  LR  SR  LR  SR  LR  SR  LR 
v1  -0.5328  -0.2722  -0.7093  -0.2693  -1.0691  -0.2669  -2.9243  -0.2649  -1.4252  -0.2631  -10.6949  -0.2647 
v2  -0.1022  -0.2722  -0.0905  -0.2693  -0.0897  -0.2669  -0.0931  -0.2649  -0.0526  -0.2631  -0.1042  -0.2647 
c11  -0.7977  -0.3000  -1.0753  -0.2991  -1.6667  -0.3052  -4.7169  -0.3130  -2.3034  -0.3146  -17.7859  -0.3202 
c21  0.0000  -0.3037  0.0000  -0.3051  0.0000  -0.3043  0.0000  -0.3056  0.0000  -0.3027  0.0000  -0.3072 
c12  -0.7977  -0.3000  -1.0753  -0.2991  -1.6667  -0.3052  -4.7169  -0.3130  -2.3034  -0.3146  -17.7859  -0.3202 
c22  0.0000  -0.3037  0.0000  -0.3051  0.0000  -0.3043  0.0000  -0.3056  0.0000  -0.3027  0.0000  -0.3072 
g1  -0.1382  -0.1653  -0.1486  -0.1539  -0.1530  -0.1349  -0.1466  -0.1125  -0.0595  -0.1026  -0.1870  -0.1073 
g2  -0.1369  -0.1638  -0.1393  -0.1442  -0.1499  -0.1322  -0.1537  -0.1180  -0.0692  -0.1195  -0.1946  -0.1116 
j1  -0.7977  -0.3000  -1.0753  -0.2991  -1.6667  -0.3052  -4.7169  -0.3130  -2.3034  -0.3146  -17.7859  -0.3202 
j2  0.0000  -0.3037  0.0000  -0.3051  0.0000  -0.3043  0.0000  -0.3056  0.0000  -0.3027  0.0000  -0.3072 
πh1  -0.7800  -0.2933  -1.0627  -0.2956  -1.6001  -0.2930  -4.2864  -0.2845  -2.4143  -0.3297  -15.7978  -0.2844 
πh2  0.0000  -0.2912  0.0000  -0.2922  0.0000  -0.2939  0.0000  -0.2963  0.0000  -0.2902  0.0000  -0.2966 
w1  -0.7880  -0.2964  -1.0562  -0.2938  -1.6435  -0.3010  -4.8001  -0.3185  -2.2150  -0.3025  -18.2917  -0.3293 
w2  0.0000  -0.2877  0.0000  -0.2896  0.0000  -0.2888  0.0000  -0.2891  0.0000  -0.2874  0.0000  -0.2911 
u1  0.3764  0.1416  0.5360  0.1491  1.0747  0.1968  3.2596  0.2163  1.2822  0.1751  13.7279  0.2472 
u2  0.0000  0.4549  0.0000  0.4499  0.0000  0.4389  0.0000  0.4428  0.0000  0.4417  0.0000  0.4476 
l1  2.8990  1.0903  3.8717  1.0771  5.0188  0.9190  12.5353  0.8319  9.4603  1.2920  41.8552  0.7536 
l2  0.0000  0.9150  0.0000  0.9381  0.0000  0.9864  0.0000  0.9822  0.0000  0.9335  0.0000  0.9743 
n1  2.9228  1.0992  3.9074  1.0870  5.1067  0.9351  12.7883  0.8487  9.5468  1.3038  43.1632  0.7771 
n2  0.0000  0.9484  0.0000  0.9701  0.0000  1.0158  0.0000  1.0128  0.0000  0.9645  0.0000  1.0053 
y1  2.2708  0.8540  3.0311  0.8432  3.7771  0.6916  9.0234  0.5988  7.7666  1.0607  29.2620  0.5268 
y2  0.0000  0.7042  0.0000  0.7239  0.0000  0.7688  0.0000  0.7652  0.0000  0.7184  0.0000  0.7563 
gf  -0.3876  -0.4636  -0.3998  -0.4138  -0.4246  -0.3743  -0.4321  -0.3316  -0.1924  -0.3321  -0.5485  -0.3147 
t1  0.8446  0.3176  1.1436  0.3181  1.8575  0.3401  5.3780  0.3569  2.4167  0.3301  21.1170  0.3802 
t2  0.0000  0.3676  0.0000  0.3654  0.0000  0.3588  0.0000  0.3626  0.0000  0.3617  0.0000  0.3655 
p  0.7977  -0.0037  1.0753  -0.0060  1.6667  0.0009  4.7169  0.0074  2.3034  0.0119  17.7859  0.0130 
  
  44 
Table A4.23 Question 2, version 3: n1=1/σ1, n2=0; exogenous: t1, t2, m; endogenous: gr1, gr2, gf1, gf2 with gf1=gf2=gf 
NSW as region 1  Vic as region 1  Qld as region 1  SA as region 1  WA as region 1  Tas as region 1 
Variable  SR  LR  SR  LR  SR  LR  SR  LR  SR  LR  SR  LR 
v1  -0.5522  -0.2647  -0.7372  -0.2627  -1.1146  -0.2618  -3.0687  -0.2590  -1.4996  -0.2571  -11.2319  -0.2593 
v2  -0.0861  -0.2647  -0.0771  -0.2627  -0.0750  -0.2618  -0.0768  -0.2590  -0.0425  -0.2571  -0.0852  -0.2593 
c11  -0.6778  -0.2532  -0.9135  -0.2533  -1.3800  -0.2523  -3.8525  -0.2526  -1.8926  -0.2536  -14.1235  -0.2522 
c21  0.0000  -0.2457  0.0000  -0.2474  0.0000  -0.2489  0.0000  -0.2497  0.0000  -0.2478  0.0000  -0.2505 
c12  -0.6778  -0.2532  -0.9135  -0.2533  -1.3800  -0.2523  -3.8525  -0.2526  -1.8926  -0.2536  -14.1235  -0.2522 
c22  0.0000  -0.2457  0.0000  -0.2474  0.0000  -0.2489  0.0000  -0.2497  0.0000  -0.2478  0.0000  -0.2505 
g1  -0.5895  -0.3134  -0.7610  -0.3020  -1.1512  -0.2972  -3.0254  -0.2821  -1.4523  -0.2722  -11.0329  -0.2815 
g2  -0.1130  -0.3280  -0.1191  -0.3151  -0.1275  -0.3079  -0.1287  -0.2926  -0.0539  -0.2901  -0.1656  -0.2909 
j1  -0.6778  -0.2532  -0.9135  -0.2533  -1.3800  -0.2523  -3.8525  -0.2526  -1.8926  -0.2536  -14.1235  -0.2522 
j2  0.0000  -0.2457  0.0000  -0.2474  0.0000  -0.2489  0.0000  -0.2497  0.0000  -0.2478  0.0000  -0.2505 
πh1  -0.7764  -0.2901  -1.0574  -0.2932  -1.5853  -0.2899  -4.2410  -0.2780  -2.3990  -0.3215  -15.5370  -0.2774 
πh2  0.0000  -0.2861  0.0000  -0.2867  0.0000  -0.2888  0.0000  -0.2911  0.0000  -0.2856  0.0000  -0.2911 
w1  -0.6293  -0.2351  -0.8422  -0.2335  -1.2469  -0.2280  -3.5306  -0.2315  -1.6973  -0.2274  -12.7133  -0.2270 
w2  0.0000  -0.2137  0.0000  -0.2164  0.0000  -0.2192  0.0000  -0.2188  0.0000  -0.2175  0.0000  -0.2197 
u1  0.3006  0.1123  0.4274  0.1185  0.8153  0.1491  2.3975  0.1572  0.9825  0.1317  9.5413  0.1704 
u2  0.0000  0.3379  0.0000  0.3361  0.0000  0.3331  0.0000  0.3352  0.0000  0.3342  0.0000  0.3377 
l1  2.9038  1.0849  3.8790  1.0754  5.0400  0.9215  12.6022  0.8262  9.4805  1.2703  42.2541  0.7545 
l2  0.0000  0.9273  0.0000  0.9475  0.0000  0.9938  0.0000  0.9905  0.0000  0.9439  0.0000  0.9820 
n1  2.9228  1.0920  3.9074  1.0833  5.1067  0.9337  12.7883  0.8384  9.5468  1.2792  43.1632  0.7707 
n2  0.0000  0.9522  0.0000  0.9713  0.0000  1.0161  0.0000  1.0137  0.0000  0.9673  0.0000  1.0054 
y1  2.2745  0.8498  3.0367  0.8419  3.7931  0.6935  9.0716  0.5947  7.7832  1.0429  29.5408  0.5275 
y2  0.0000  0.7136  0.0000  0.7311  0.0000  0.7746  0.0000  0.7717  0.0000  0.7264  0.0000  0.7624 
gr1  -0.7391  -0.2761  -1.0091  -0.2798  -1.5963  -0.2919  -4.3935  -0.2880  -2.0347  -0.2726  -16.5008  -0.2946 
gr2  0.0000  -0.2992  0.0000  -0.3021  0.0000  -0.3085  0.0000  -0.3049  0.0000  -0.3007  0.0000  -0.3100 
gf1  -0.3198  -0.3806  -0.3418  -0.3394  -0.3611  -0.3066  -0.3618  -0.2705  -0.1499  -0.2714  -0.4668  -0.2562 
p  0.6778  0.0075  0.9135  0.0059  1.3800  0.0034  3.8525  0.0029  1.8926  0.0058  14.1235  0.0017 
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Table A4.31 Question 3 version 1: n1=1/σ1, gr1=1; endogenous: m, t1, t2, m; exogenous: gr1, gr2, gf1, gf2  
NSW as region 1  Vic as region 1  Qld as region 1  SA as region 1  WA as region 1  Tas as region 1 
Variable  SR  LR  SR  LR  SR  LR  SR  LR  SR  LR  SR  LR 
v1  -0.4947  -0.2602  -0.6718  -0.2611  -1.0321  -0.2632  -2.8872  -0.2643  -1.3880  -0.2593  -10.6548  -0.2647 
v2  -0.1102  -0.2602  -0.0946  -0.2611  -0.0925  -0.2632  -0.0943  -0.2643  -0.0559  -0.2593  -0.1045  -0.2647 
c11  -0.9906  -0.5502  -1.2689  -0.5459  -1.8836  -0.5732  -4.9546  -0.6006  -2.5245  -0.6060  -18.0613  -0.6350 
c21  -0.0308  -0.3066  -0.0333  -0.3188  -0.0373  -0.3254  -0.0409  -0.3334  -0.0192  -0.3253  -0.0535  -0.3371 
c12  -0.9906  -0.5502  -1.2689  -0.5459  -1.8836  -0.5732  -4.9546  -0.6006  -2.5245  -0.6060  -18.0613  -0.6350 
c22  -0.0308  -0.3066  -0.0333  -0.3188  -0.0373  -0.3254  -0.0409  -0.3334  -0.0192  -0.3253  -0.0535  -0.3371 
g1  0.6433  0.6433  0.6282  0.6282  0.6397  0.6397  0.6607  0.6607  0.6910  0.6910  0.6590  0.6590 
j1  -0.9598  -0.5150  -1.2357  -0.5117  -1.8462  -0.5398  -4.9137  -0.5687  -2.5053  -0.5745  -18.0078  -0.6040 
j2  0.0000  -0.2714  0.0000  -0.2846  0.0000  -0.2920  0.0000  -0.3015  0.0000  -0.2938  0.0000  -0.3061 
πh1  -0.7847  -0.3498  -1.0679  -0.3525  -1.6094  -0.3551  -4.2967  -0.3484  -2.4218  -0.3980  -15.8136  -0.3552 
πh2  0.0000  -0.2602  0.0000  -0.2726  0.0000  -0.2820  0.0000  -0.2924  0.0000  -0.2818  0.0000  -0.2956 
w1  -1.0027  -0.5633  -1.2683  -0.5572  -1.8920  -0.6037  -5.0890  -0.6675  -2.4695  -0.6128  -18.6298  -0.7310 
w2  0.0000  -0.2571  0.0000  -0.2702  0.0000  -0.2772  0.0000  -0.2852  0.0000  -0.2790  0.0000  -0.2901 
u1  0.4789  0.2691  0.6437  0.2828  1.2372  0.3947  3.4558  0.4533  1.4295  0.3547  13.9816  0.5486 
u2  0.0000  0.4065  0.0000  0.4197  0.0000  0.4211  0.0000  0.4369  0.0000  0.4288  0.0000  0.4460 
l1  2.8926  1.2760  3.8646  1.2579  5.0055  1.0714  12.5201  0.9733  9.4504  1.5204  41.8311  0.8750 
l2  0.0000  0.8178  0.0000  0.8750  0.0000  0.9465  0.0000  0.9690  0.0000  0.9062  0.0000  0.9708 
n1  2.9228  1.2930  3.9074  1.2767  5.1067  1.1037  12.7883  1.0085  9.5468  1.5443  43.1632  0.9272 
n2  0.0000  0.8476  0.0000  0.9048  0.0000  0.9748  0.0000  0.9993  0.0000  0.9363  0.0000  1.0017 
y1  2.2657  0.9995  3.0255  0.9848  3.7671  0.8063  9.0125  0.7006  7.7585  1.2482  29.2451  0.6117 
y2  0.0000  0.6293  0.0000  0.6752  0.0000  0.7377  0.0000  0.7550  0.0000  0.6974  0.0000  0.7536 
t1  1.9874  1.5164  2.2768  1.5069  3.0211  1.5651  6.6020  1.6482  3.6045  1.5787  22.3967  1.7334 
t2  0.0000  0.3285  0.0000  0.3408  0.0000  0.3443  0.0000  0.3578  0.0000  0.3512  0.0000  0.3642 
m  0.3105  0.3544  0.3357  0.3453  0.3768  0.3377  0.4129  0.3215  0.1941  0.3176  0.5395  0.3124 
p  0.9598  0.2436  1.2357  0.2272  1.8462  0.2478  4.9137  0.2672  2.5053  0.2807  18.0078  0.2979 
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Table A4.32 Question 3, version 2: n1=1/σ1, t1=-1; exogenous: t1, t2, m; endogenous: gr1, gr2, gf1, gf2 with gf1=gf2=gf 
NSW as region 1  Vic as region 1  Qld as region 1  SA as region 1  WA as region 1  Tas as region 1 
Variable  SR  LR  SR  LR  SR  LR  SR  LR  SR  LR  SR  LR 
v1  -0.5752  -0.2618  -0.7616  -0.2611  -1.1391  -0.2597  -3.0956  -0.2578  -1.5304  -0.2581  -11.2573  -0.2588 
v2  -0.0670  -0.2618  -0.0653  -0.2611  -0.0671  -0.2597  -0.0737  -0.2578  -0.0384  -0.2581  -0.0843  -0.2588 
c11  -0.5359  -0.0730  -0.7720  -0.0756  -1.2257  -0.0628  -3.6917  -0.0559  -1.7226  -0.0443  -13.9501  -0.0460 
c21  0.0000  -0.2679  0.0000  -0.2610  0.0000  -0.2567  0.0000  -0.2522  0.0000  -0.2537  0.0000  -0.2511 
c12  -0.5359  -0.0730  -0.7720  -0.0756  -1.2257  -0.0628  -3.6917  -0.0559  -1.7226  -0.0443  -13.9501  -0.0460 
c22  0.0000  -0.2679  0.0000  -0.2610  0.0000  -0.2567  0.0000  -0.2522  0.0000  -0.2537  0.0000  -0.2511 
g1  -1.1238  -0.8228  -1.2965  -0.8123  -1.6886  -0.8080  -3.5607  -0.7900  -2.0286  -0.8203  -11.5465  -0.7697 
g2  -0.0846  -0.3190  -0.1015  -0.3082  -0.1154  -0.3014  -0.1241  -0.2896  -0.0476  -0.2895  -0.1642  -0.2899 
j1  -0.5359  -0.0730  -0.7720  -0.0756  -1.2257  -0.0628  -3.6917  -0.0559  -1.7226  -0.0443  -13.9501  -0.0460 
j2  0.0000  -0.2679  0.0000  -0.2610  0.0000  -0.2567  0.0000  -0.2522  0.0000  -0.2537  0.0000  -0.2511 
πh1  -0.7722  -0.2420  -1.0527  -0.2466  -1.5773  -0.2415  -4.2325  -0.2300  -2.3927  -0.2654  -15.5247  -0.2290 
πh2  0.0000  -0.3119  0.0000  -0.3024  0.0000  -0.2978  0.0000  -0.2940  0.0000  -0.2924  0.0000  -0.2918 
w1  -0.4414  -0.0116  -0.6550  -0.0130  -1.0334  0.0173  -3.2946  0.0376  -1.4830  0.0221  -12.4491  0.0667 
w2  0.0000  -0.2330  0.0000  -0.2282  0.0000  -0.2261  0.0000  -0.2210  0.0000  -0.2227  0.0000  -0.2202 
u1  0.2108  0.0056  0.3324  0.0066  0.6757  -0.0113  2.2373  -0.0255  0.8585  -0.0128  9.3431  -0.0500 
u2  0.0000  0.3684  0.0000  0.3545  0.0000  0.3435  0.0000  0.3385  0.0000  0.3422  0.0000  0.3385 
l1  2.9095  0.9263  3.8853  0.9282  5.0514  0.8045  12.6147  0.7209  9.4889  1.0819  42.2730  0.6753 
l2  0.0000  1.0111  0.0000  0.9994  0.0000  1.0248  0.0000  1.0004  0.0000  0.9665  0.0000  0.9844 
n1  2.9228  0.9266  3.9074  0.9286  5.1067  0.8036  12.7883  0.7190  9.5468  1.0811  43.1632  0.6706 
n2  0.0000  1.0382  0.0000  1.0246  0.0000  1.0478  0.0000  1.0238  0.0000  0.9905  0.0000  1.0078 
y1  2.2790  0.7255  3.0417  0.7266  3.8017  0.6055  9.0806  0.5190  7.7901  0.8882  29.5540  0.4721 
y2  0.0000  0.7781  0.0000  0.7712  0.0000  0.7987  0.0000  0.7794  0.0000  0.7438  0.0000  0.7642 
gr1  -1.6141  -1.1094  -1.8915  -1.1222  -2.4557  -1.1106  -5.2104  -1.0640  -2.8766  -1.0723  -17.2822  -1.0378 
gr2  0.0000  -0.3262  0.0000  -0.3186  0.0000  -0.3182  0.0000  -0.3080  0.0000  -0.3079  0.0000  -0.3108 
gf1  -0.2394  -0.3058  -0.2912  -0.2886  -0.3269  -0.2707  -0.3488  -0.2565  -0.1322  -0.2567  -0.4629  -0.2518 
p  0.5359  -0.1950  0.7720  -0.1854  1.2257  -0.1938  3.6917  -0.1963  1.7226  -0.2094  13.9501  -0.2051 
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 Table A4.41 Question 4: n1=1/σ1, gf1=1; endogenous: m, t1, t2, m; exogenous: gr1, gr2, gf1, gf2  
NSW as region 1  Vic as region 1  Qld as region 1  SA as region 1  WA as region 1  Tas as region 1 
Variable  SR  LR  SR  LR  SR  LR  SR  LR  SR  LR  SR  LR 
v1  -0.4756  -0.2576  -0.6425  -0.2586  -0.9952  -0.2614  -2.8467  -0.2642  -1.3591  -0.2568  -10.6035  -0.2648 
v2  -0.1182  -0.2576  -0.1030  -0.2586  -0.0985  -0.2614  -0.0967  -0.2642  -0.0581  -0.2568  -0.1053  -0.2648 
c11  -0.8574  -0.4480  -1.1307  -0.4548  -1.7195  -0.4690  -4.7641  -0.4771  -2.3296  -0.4559  -17.8413  -0.5012 
c21  -0.0598  -0.3162  -0.0554  -0.3223  -0.0528  -0.3278  -0.0472  -0.3352  -0.0263  -0.3252  -0.0555  -0.3377 
c12  -0.8574  -0.4480  -1.1307  -0.4548  -1.7195  -0.4690  -4.7641  -0.4771  -2.3296  -0.4559  -17.8413  -0.5012 
c22  -0.0598  -0.3162  -0.0554  -0.3223  -0.0528  -0.3278  -0.0472  -0.3352  -0.0263  -0.3252  -0.0555  -0.3377 
g1  0.3567  0.3567  0.3718  0.3718  0.3603  0.3603  0.3393  0.3393  0.3090  0.3090  0.3410  0.3410 
j1  -0.7977  -0.3841  -1.0753  -0.3985  -1.6667  -0.4199  -4.7169  -0.4388  -2.3034  -0.4177  -17.7859  -0.4681 
j2  0.0000  -0.2524  0.0000  -0.2660  0.0000  -0.2787  0.0000  -0.2969  0.0000  -0.2870  0.0000  -0.3046 
πh1  -0.7800  -0.3756  -1.0627  -0.3938  -1.6001  -0.4031  -4.2864  -0.3987  -2.4143  -0.4378  -15.7978  -0.4158 
πh2  0.0000  -0.2419  0.0000  -0.2548  0.0000  -0.2691  0.0000  -0.2879  0.0000  -0.2752  0.0000  -0.2941 
w1  -0.7880  -0.3795  -1.0562  -0.3914  -1.6435  -0.4140  -4.8001  -0.4465  -2.2150  -0.4017  -18.2917  -0.4814 
w2  0.0000  -0.2390  0.0000  -0.2526  0.0000  -0.2645  0.0000  -0.2808  0.0000  -0.2725  0.0000  -0.2887 
u1  0.3764  0.1813  0.5360  0.1986  1.0747  0.2707  3.2596  0.3032  1.2822  0.2325  13.7279  0.3613 
u2  0.0000  0.3779  0.0000  0.3923  0.0000  0.4019  0.0000  0.4302  0.0000  0.4188  0.0000  0.4438 
l1  2.8990  1.3962  3.8717  1.4348  5.0188  1.2643  12.5353  1.1660  9.4603  1.7155  41.8552  1.1016 
l2  0.0000  0.7602  0.0000  0.8180  0.0000  0.9033  0.0000  0.9541  0.0000  0.8851  0.0000  0.9660 
n1  2.9228  1.4076  3.9074  1.4481  5.1067  1.2865  12.7883  1.1896  9.5468  1.7312  43.1632  1.1360 
n2  0.0000  0.7880  0.0000  0.8459  0.0000  0.9302  0.0000  0.9839  0.0000  0.9145  0.0000  0.9968 
y1  2.2708  1.0936  3.0311  1.1233  3.7771  0.9515  9.0234  0.8394  7.7666  1.4084  29.2620  0.7701 
y2  0.0000  0.5851  0.0000  0.6312  0.0000  0.7040  0.0000  0.7433  0.0000  0.6812  0.0000  0.7499 
t1  0.8446  0.4068  1.1436  0.4238  1.8575  0.4679  5.3780  0.5003  2.4167  0.4382  21.1170  0.5558 
t2  0.0000  0.3054  0.0000  0.3186  0.0000  0.3286  0.0000  0.3523  0.0000  0.3430  0.0000  0.3624 
m  0.6034  0.6443  0.5592  0.5682  0.5331  0.4957  0.4766  0.3866  0.2650  0.3856  0.5598  0.3338 
p  0.7977  0.1318  1.0753  0.1325  1.6667  0.1412  4.7169  0.1419  2.3034  0.1307  17.7859  0.1635 
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Table A4.51 Question 5, version 1: n1=1/σ1; exogenous: gf1, gf2 ; endogenous: gr1, gr2, t1, t2, m (maximising regional 
governments) 
NSW as region 1  Vic as region 1  Qld as region 1  SA as region 1  WA as region 1  Tas as region 1 
Variable  SR  LR  SR  LR  SR  LR  SR  LR  SR  LR  SR  LR 
v1  -0.5507  -0.2528  -0.7390  -0.2542  -1.1194  -0.2562  -3.0983  -0.2557  -1.5173  -0.2535  -11.3339  -0.2573 
v2  -0.0718  -0.2528  -0.0654  -0.2542  -0.0659  -0.2562  -0.0694  -0.2557  -0.0383  -0.2535  -0.0769  -0.2573 
c11  -0.6532  -0.2528  -0.8765  -0.2542  -1.3252  -0.2562  -3.6661  -0.2557  -1.7958  -0.2535  -13.3681  -0.2573 
c21  -0.0127  -0.2528  -0.0156  -0.2542  -0.0182  -0.2562  -0.0153  -0.2557  -0.0052  -0.2535  -0.0014  -0.2573 
c12  -0.6532  -0.2528  -0.8765  -0.2542  -1.3252  -0.2562  -3.6661  -0.2557  -1.7958  -0.2535  -13.3681  -0.2573 
c22  -0.0127  -0.2528  -0.0156  -0.2542  -0.0182  -0.2562  -0.0153  -0.2557  -0.0052  -0.2535  -0.0014  -0.2573 
j1  -0.6346  -0.2301  -0.8537  -0.2312  -1.2983  -0.2331  -3.6360  -0.2327  -1.7839  -0.2307  -13.3284  -0.2342 
j2  0.0059  -0.2301  0.0072  -0.2312  0.0087  -0.2331  0.0148  -0.2327  0.0067  -0.2307  0.0383  -0.2342 
πh1  -0.7751  -0.2855  -1.0554  -0.2905  -1.5811  -0.2891  -4.2296  -0.2767  -2.3950  -0.3167  -15.4804  -0.2788 
πh2  0.0006  -0.2866  0.0007  -0.2858  0.0008  -0.2872  0.0014  -0.2895  0.0007  -0.2844  0.0037  -0.2895 
w1  -0.5721  -0.2059  -0.7632  -0.2051  -1.1339  -0.2013  -3.2127  -0.2025  -1.5603  -0.1998  -11.5022  -0.1980 
w2  0.0074  -0.1931  0.0091  -0.1956  0.0109  -0.1994  0.0186  -0.1976  0.0085  -0.1956  0.0483  -0.1992 
u1  0.2733  0.0984  0.3873  0.1041  0.7414  0.1316  2.1817  0.1375  0.9032  0.1156  8.6324  0.1486 
u2  -0.0117  0.3053  -0.0141  0.3039  -0.0166  0.3030  -0.0285  0.3026  -0.0131  0.3006  -0.0742  0.3062 
l1  2.9055  1.0706  3.8816  1.0692  5.0460  0.9239  12.6190  0.8267  9.4858  1.2555  42.3407  0.7646 
l2  0.0009  0.9376  0.0010  0.9522  0.0011  0.9956  0.0020  0.9928  0.0009  0.9481  0.0051  0.9840 
n1  2.9228  1.0768  3.9074  1.0761  5.1067  0.9346  12.7883  0.8374  9.5468  1.2633  43.1632  0.7787 
n2  0.0000  0.9601  0.0000  0.9738  0.0000  1.0159  0.0000  1.0138  0.0000  0.9692  0.0000  1.0053 
y1  2.2759  0.8386  3.0388  0.8370  3.7976  0.6953  9.0837  0.5951  7.7876  1.0307  29.6014  0.5345 
y2  0.0007  0.7216  0.0008  0.7348  0.0009  0.7760  0.0015  0.7735  0.0007  0.7297  0.0040  0.7639 
gr1  -1.0054  -0.3929  -1.3816  -0.4046  -2.0512  -0.4004  -5.4938  -0.3870  -2.5729  -0.3668  -20.0831  -0.3905 
gr2  -0.0296  -0.3908  -0.0372  -0.3902  -0.0483  -0.3960  -0.0804  -0.3969  -0.0361  -0.3958  -0.2093  -0.3988 
t1  -0.3043  -0.1379  -0.4222  -0.1436  -0.5294  -0.1260  -1.3468  -0.1216  -0.6393  -0.1159  -4.5845  -0.1188 
t2  -0.0365  -0.1100  -0.0451  -0.1058  -0.0562  -0.1018  -0.0957  -0.1095  -0.0435  -0.1141  -0.2467  -0.1048 
m  0.1875  0.2285  0.2300  0.2315  0.2712  0.2324  0.3036  0.2321  0.1201  0.2294  0.4003  0.2334 
p  0.6405  0.0000  0.8609  0.0000  1.3070  0.0000  3.6508  0.0000  1.7906  0.0000  13.3667  0.0000 
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Table A4.52 Question 5, version 2: n1=1 n2=1; exogenous: gf1, gf2 ; endogenous: gr1, gr2, t1, t2, m (maximising regional 
governments) 
NSW as region 1  Vic as region 1  Qld as region 1  SA as region 1  WA as region 1  Tas as region 1 
Variable  SR  LR  SR  LR  SR  LR  SR  LR  SR  LR  SR  LR 
v1  -0.2404  -0.2528  -0.2412  -0.2542  -0.2697  -0.2562  -0.2944  -0.2557  -0.2133  -0.2535  -0.3152  -0.2573 
v2  -0.2603  -0.2528  -0.2593  -0.2542  -0.2532  -0.2562  -0.2532  -0.2557  -0.2603  -0.2535  -0.2564  -0.2573 
c11  -0.2361  -0.2528  -0.2375  -0.2542  -0.2729  -0.2562  -0.3021  -0.2557  -0.2045  -0.2535  -0.3258  -0.2573 
c21  -0.2628  -0.2528  -0.2606  -0.2542  -0.2524  -0.2562  -0.2524  -0.2557  -0.2614  -0.2535  -0.2560  -0.2573 
c12  -0.2361  -0.2528  -0.2375  -0.2542  -0.2729  -0.2562  -0.3021  -0.2557  -0.2045  -0.2535  -0.3258  -0.2573 
c22  -0.2628  -0.2528  -0.2606  -0.2542  -0.2524  -0.2562  -0.2524  -0.2557  -0.2614  -0.2535  -0.2560  -0.2573 
j1  -0.2133  -0.2301  -0.2145  -0.2312  -0.2498  -0.2331  -0.2790  -0.2327  -0.1814  -0.2307  -0.3026  -0.2342 
j2  -0.2400  -0.2301  -0.2377  -0.2312  -0.2293  -0.2331  -0.2294  -0.2327  -0.2383  -0.2307  -0.2328  -0.2342 
πh1  -0.2651  -0.2855  -0.2700  -0.2905  -0.3094  -0.2891  -0.3305  -0.2767  -0.2507  -0.3167  -0.3582  -0.2788 
πh2  -0.2985  -0.2866  -0.2935  -0.2858  -0.2827  -0.2872  -0.2855  -0.2895  -0.2935  -0.2844  -0.2879  -0.2895 
w1  -0.1907  -0.2059  -0.1901  -0.2051  -0.2159  -0.2013  -0.2434  -0.2025  -0.1565  -0.1998  -0.2570  -0.1980 
w2  -0.2014  -0.1931  -0.2011  -0.1956  -0.1961  -0.1994  -0.1946  -0.1976  -0.2021  -0.1956  -0.1979  -0.1992 
u1  0.0911  0.0984  0.0965  0.1041  0.1412  0.1316  0.1653  0.1375  0.0906  0.1156  0.1929  0.1486 
u2  0.3185  0.3053  0.3125  0.3039  0.2980  0.3030  0.2981  0.3026  0.3106  0.3006  0.3042  0.3062 
l1  0.9943  1.0706  0.9936  1.0692  0.9884  0.9239  0.9872  0.8267  0.9939  1.2555  0.9816  0.7646 
l2  0.9766  0.9376  0.9778  0.9522  0.9800  0.9956  0.9794  0.9928  0.9782  0.9481  0.9789  0.9840 
n1  1.0000  1.0768  1.0000  1.0761  1.0000  0.9346  1.0000  0.8374  1.0000  1.2633  1.0000  0.7787 
n2  1.0000  0.9601  1.0000  0.9738  1.0000  1.0159  1.0000  1.0138  1.0000  0.9692  1.0000  1.0053 
y1  0.7788  0.8386  0.7779  0.8370  0.7439  0.6953  0.7106  0.5951  0.8160  1.0307  0.6863  0.5345 
y2  0.7516  0.7216  0.7545  0.7348  0.7638  0.7760  0.7630  0.7735  0.7528  0.7297  0.7599  0.7639 
gr1  -0.3674  -0.3929  -0.3784  -0.4046  -0.4263  -0.4004  -0.4565  -0.3870  -0.2967  -0.3668  -0.4933  -0.3905 
gr2  -0.4059  -0.3908  -0.3997  -0.3902  -0.3905  -0.3960  -0.3926  -0.3969  -0.4073  -0.3958  -0.3979  -0.3988 
t1  -0.1309  -0.1379  -0.1361  -0.1436  -0.1323  -0.1260  -0.1383  -0.1216  -0.0993  -0.1159  -0.1421  -0.1188 
t2  -0.1130  -0.1100  -0.1074  -0.1058  -0.1011  -0.1018  -0.1093  -0.1095  -0.1163  -0.1141  -0.1055  -0.1048 
m  0.2302  0.2285  0.2316  0.2315  0.2330  0.2324  0.2331  0.2321  0.2329  0.2294  0.2343  0.2334 
p  -0.0266  0.0000  -0.0231  0.0000  0.0205  0.0000  0.0497  0.0000  -0.0569  0.0000  0.0698  0.0000 
 
 
 